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TAX PLANNING FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES
ADAM CHASE*
INTRODUCTION
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as
having more to do with the morals and civilization of a
people than any other institution, has always been subject to
the control of the legislature. That body prescribes the age at
which parties may contract to marry, the procedure or form
essential to constitute marriage, the duties and obligations it
creates, its effects upon the property rights of both, present
and prospective, and the acts which may constitute grounds
for its dissolution.'
Justice Field's recognition in Maynard v. Hill of the legislature's broad
authority over the definition of marriage neglects an important element: the
legislature also prescribes who may marry whom.
By denying same-sex couples2 the ability to enter into legally recognized
marriages, legislative bodies have prevented lesbian women and gay men from
availing themselves of the panoply of entitlements and privileges that come as
part of the institution of marriage. This article explores various practical and
economic advantages included in the marital package that are unavailable to
unmarried couples. Specifically, the article focuses on the different tax treat-
ment afforded married couples and gay and lesbian couples. The analysis
highlights methods of achieving parallel rights and benefits through, inter alia,
* Associate, Adams and Johnston, P.L.C., Boulder, Colorado; LL.M. in Taxation, 1994,
New York University School of Law; J.D., 1991, University of Colorado School of Law; B.A.,
1988, Haverford College; B.A., 1987, University of Kent, U.K. The author wishes to thank James
and Ron, and Diane and Ivette for their inspiration and encouragement, and Susan Murray and
Professor Guy B. Maxfield for their direction and comments.
1. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
2. This article uses the terms "same-sex couples," "lesbian women," "gay men," and
"homosexuals" somewhat interchangeably. Terminology-such as the question of whether to
use "lover," "partner," or "significant other"-has taken an important position within the gay-
rights movement, and the phrases used here are intended to be the most sensitive to current
trends and ideas of referring to individuals with a same-sex sexual orientation. For a dis-
cussion of "naming" issues, see Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?
Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46
U. MtAMI L. REV. 511, 530-37 (1992); Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation
Law in the Mid-Eighties (pt. I), 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 459, 463-64 (1985); Mary N.
Cameli, Note, Extending Family Benefits to Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 68 CHI-KENT L.
REV. 447, 447 n.3 (1992).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
contracting and tax planning. Finally, the article looks to the future likelihood
of legally recognized same-sex marriages and the tax ramifications of such
recognition.
Marriage, as "the most important relation in life," encompasses far more
than the legal, economic, and property rights relationships that are the subject
of this article. The admittedly narrow scope excludes analysis of the emotion-
al, political, and philosophical arguments that are at least on par with the
material arguments for granting legitimacy to gay and lesbian marriages?
I. SAME-SEX COUPLES AND MARRIED COUPLES: THE CONTRAST IN
TREATMENT
Tax law touches almost every aspect of human conduct. We are taxed
from cradle to grave, and even then our estates-if we have them-are subject
to tax. Accordingly, prudent tax planning involves a comprehensive view of
life's many stages and transactions, encompassing both the expected and unex-
pected.' For a married couple whose legal status carries substantial automatic
tax preferences and protections, the task of tax planning is less difficult than
for a similarly situated lesbian or gay couple that must resort to complex legal
arrangements in an attempt to achieve parity.
As compared to same-sex couples, married couples are given preferential
treatment by the government, employers, insurers, and private organizations. In
response to this discrimination, lesbian and gay couples have entered creative
legal relationships, some of which have substantial tax ramifications. To cir-
cumvent any negative tax consequences resulting from these legal mecha-
nisms, same-sex couples must employ careful tax planning strategies. Accord-
ingly, an exposition of the discrimination against lesbian and gay couples is a
functional starting point for an analysis of tax planning for same-sex couples.
3. For sources of non-materialistic, socio-political arguments underlying the recognition
and acceptance of same-sex marriage, see Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should
Seek the Right to Marry, in LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE 13, 16-19 (Suzanne Sherman ed.,
1992) (explaining politically and philosophically why every lesbian woman and gay man
should have the right to marry the same-sex partner of their choice, and why the gay-rights
movement aggressively should seek full legal recognition of same-sex marriages); Jennifer L.
Heeb, Note, Homosexual Marriage, the Changing- American Family, and the Heterosexual
Right to Privacy, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 347, 361 (1993) (acknowledging the inadequacies
of the marriage alternatives for gay and lesbian couples); Lisa R. Zimmer, Note, Family,
Marriage, and the Same-Sex Couple, 12 CARDozo L. REV. 681, 688, 697 (1990) (concluding
that gay and lesbian couples are only able to gain the psychological harmony of emotional
commitment and legal protection through marriage).
4. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behav-
ioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 986-87 (1993) (stating that tax
laws play a role in important decisions affecting everyday life for many American families
and examining tax rules in terms of the types of families they promote through behavioral
incentives and by constraining and shaping individual choices).
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A. During the Relationship
The marital relationship confers upon heterosexual couples special legal
and social advantages affecting their taxes, intestate succession, health care,
insurance, organizational memberships, and their means of holding real es-
tate. 5 In contrast, lesbian and gay couples involved in long-term, intimate
relationships are denied these and other privileges.6
1. Government Discrimination
The government, whether federal, state, or local, treats married couples
more favorably than it does same-sex couples, be it in a legislative, executive,
or judicial capacity. Although this disparate treatment almost always has indi-
rect tax ramifications, the Internal Revenue Code (the Code)7 and Treasury
Regulations (the Regulations)8 provide direct invidious treatment of married
couples. The generous provisions offered by the Code and the Regulations,
which are thoroughly discussed below, include the right to file joint returns,9
5. Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbi-
an Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage, " 79
VA. L. REV. 1535, 1535 (1993); Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal
Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 874 (1979).
6. Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1508, 1611 (1989); see also John C. Beattie, Note, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination:
A Proposal for the Protection of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1415, 1415-16
(1991) (discussing the role that state prohibitions against marital discrimination have played
in protecting the rights of unmarried couples); Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The
Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1640, 1642-43 (1991) [hereinafter Looking for a Family Resemblance] (whether a relationship
qualifies as a family relationship can determine eligibility for "desirable housing, immigration
privileges, public welfare benefits, private insurance benefits, child custody and visitation
rights, and rights of intestate succession"). But see WASH. BLADE, May 31, 1985, at 9 (the
American Automobile Association of Southern California offers gay couples the same dis-
count on auto insurance that married couples enjoy).
7. I.R.C. §§ 1-7803 (West 1994).
8. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.01-1 to 702.9037-2.
9. I.R.C. § 6013 (West 1994). Subject to specified exceptions, taxpayers can file joint-
ly if they are "married" and both agree to file a joint return. I.R.C. § 6013(a) (West 1994).
On a joint return, the taxpayers report their combined income and deduct their combined
allowable expenses, thus providing beneficial pooling of disparate income earners. See DE-
PARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 1993 TAX GUIDE FOR INDIVIDU-
ALS (CCH), Publication 17, Cat. No. 10311G, at 22 ("If you and your spouse decide to file
a joint return, your tax may be lower than the tax for the other filing statuses. Also, your
standard deduction . . . may be higher."). Married status includes couples that are married
and living together or separate, couples living together in common law marriage if recog-
nized in their state of residence, and couples separated under an interlocutory divorce decree.
Id.
Note also that signing a joint return may disadvantage spouses who are jointly and
severally liable for underpayments attributable to the other spouse. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (West
1994). The innocent spouse provision, however, provides some relief in extreme cases. I.R.C.
§ 6013(e) (West 1994). See generally Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem:
Joint and Several Liability for Income Taxes Should be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317
(1990). Married couples are also not allowed to recognize losses on sales between spouses.
I.R.C. §§ 267, 1041 (West 1994). Similarly, joint-filers are subject to a number of tax attri-
bution rules that treat them as a unitary taxpayer. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 318(a), 453(e) (West
1995]
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beneficial adjustments for gift taxes paid by a decedent spouse," a full mari-
tal deduction for transfers to a spouse upon death," tax-free inter-spousal
transfers,'2 and special estate tax treatment for joint interests of husband and
wife.'3
2. Military Discrimination
The government's most prominent discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation occurs in the armed services. Despite the military's policy of
"don't ask, don't tell," homosexual conduct is still grounds for discharge.
4
While thousands of gay men and lesbian women have discharged from the
military, 5 the armed services is not the only government branch in which
employees have lost their jobs because of their sexual orientation. 6
1994).
10. I.R.C. § 2001(d) (West 1994).
I1. I.R.C. § 2056(a) (West 1994).
12. I.R.C. § 1041 (West 1994); see I.R.C. § 2523 (West 1994) (providing a 100%
marital deduction for lifetime gifts between spouses); I.R.C. § 2513 (West 1994) (providing
joint gift treatment for a gift made by one spouse).
13. I.R.C. § 2040(b) (West 1994). But note that one provision no longer discriminates
in granting tax-exempt status to organizations promoting gay rights. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West
1994). In Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the
court struck down Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i), which gave the Commissioner the
discretion to deny exempt status to organizations deemed to be controversial.
14. Gay Rights in the Military: The Pentagon's New Policy Guidelines on Homosexuals
in the Military, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1993. at 16. Homosexual conduct is defined as "a
homosexual act, a statement that the member is homosexual or bisexual, or a marriage or
attempted marriage to someone of the same gender." Id. The Pentagon's policy guidelines
make no distinction between off-base and on-base conduct. Id. The policy, though protecting
speech within the context of priest-penitent, husband-wife and attorney-client relationships,
does not extend the privilege to communications between partners in a gay or lesbian rela-
tionship. Id. Finally, the policy states that an individual's sexual conduct is a legitimate
security concern if it could make an individual susceptible to exploitation or coercion. Id.
On March 30, 1995, a federal judge struck down the "don't ask, don't tell" policy as
unconstitutional, on the grounds that it violates gay service members' rights to free speech
and equal protection. Able v. United States, 1995 WL 149460 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1995).
Although the opinion applies only to the six service members who were plaintiffs in the
case, it represents "the first step in a process that could lead to a Supreme Court ruling on
the policy." Military Policy on Gays Ruled Unconstitutional, Judge Blocks Dismissal of Six
Homosexuals Under 'Don't Tell' Rule, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 31, 1995, at IA.
For an additional military discharge case, see Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 59 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (finding that the discharge of a Naval midshipman who, upon questioning, ad-
mitted his homosexuality, violated the rational basis test and the Fifth Amendment right to
equal protection). On November 22, 1994, an en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia affirmed the panel decision. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
15. See NAN D. HUNTER El AL., THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN: THE BASIC
ACLU GUIDE TO A GAY PERSON'S RIGHTS 41 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter THE RIGHTS OF
LESBIANS AND GAY MEN] (citing Department of Defense statistics that 6,770 people were
discharged from the military from .1985 to 1989 on the basis of homosexuality). Compare
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1396-98 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding the Army's right
to fire a gay employee) with benShalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 977 (E.D.
Wis. 1980) (holding that the military's exclusionary policy arbitrarily excludes homosexuals
and violates the First Amendment), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990). See also Develop-
ments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at 1554-57, 1559 n.31.




In the courts," legally recognized heterosexual marriages are given dis-
parate treatment in a number of ways.18 Gays and lesbians cannot sue in tort
for negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, or wrongful
death. 9 Nor are communications between gay and lesbian partners protected
by the spousal communication privilege.2" Moreover, courts often have creat-
ed a presumption against granting custody or visitation to gay parents.2' Also,
married couples are allowed jail visitation rights that are often denied to gay
and lesbian partners.22
4. Benefits Discrimination
Whether through legislation or executive decision, the government also
grants special benefits to married couples that it does not extend to same-sex
couples. Programs such as social security, veteran's benefits, and disability
to fire a gay employee), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 337 (1993); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d
97, 102-04 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding the FBI's right to fire a gay employee). But see
City of Dallas v. England, 846 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (clearing the way for a
lesbian to serve in the Dallas Police Department by ruling that the city could not base its
hiring policy on a 114-year-old state law criminalizing sodomy); Ruling on Gay Police Offi-
cers, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1993, at A14.
17. For a comprehensive discussion of the treatment of gay men and lesbian women
within the criminal justice system, including analyses of sodomy statutes, bias crimes against
gay men and lesbian women, sexual orientation criminal defenses, evidentiary issues, and
homophobia as it relates to voir dire, see Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and
the Law, supra note 6, at 1519-52.
18. One explanation for the disparate judicial treatment is the rigid analysis courts have
resorted to in resolving issues that arise when static legal definitions of family relationships
clash with dynamic demographic changes. Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 6,
at 1642-50.
19. Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 588-90 (Cal. 1988) (holding that an unmarried
partner could not collect damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress or loss of
consortium); Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 616 P.2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1980) (married
status provided prima facie evidence of sufficiently close relationship for collection under
theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress); Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873,
877-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that an intimate same-sex relationship does not fall
within the close relationship standard for negligent infliction of emotional distress). See gen-
erally THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 89 (no state has extend-
ed the right to recover damages from those responsible for an accidental death to include
unmarried people); Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6,
at 1620-23; Heeb, supra note 3, at 352 n.20, 353 n.26; M. Elizabeth Thames, Comment,
Consortium Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 145, 149-50 (1985).
20. Stoddard, supra note 3, at 15; James Trosino, Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex
Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REv. 93, 96 (1993).
21. E.g., Bottoms v. Bottoms, 1995 WL 234222 (Va. Apr. 21, 1995); Larson v. Larson,
No. CA 94-00154 (Ark. Ct. App. filed Jan. 11, 1994); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694
(Va. 1985); see Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that a
lesbian non-biological parent did not have standing as a parent under domestic relations law
to seek visitation rights with a child that she and her ex-partner raised); THE RIGHTS OF
LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 94-101. Contra Jenkins v. Jenkins, 447 S.E.2d
554 (W. Va. 1994) (decided in favor of lesbian mother).
22. Barbara J. Cox, Alternative Families: Obtaining Traditional Family Benefits Through
Litigation, Legislation and Collective Bargaining, 2 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 46-50 (1986).
19951
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insurance, which grant benefits to spouses and certain family members, ex-
clude same-sex partners as payment recipients. 3 Married couples also are




In the realm of employment, lesbian women and gay men are subject to
mistreatment 2- similar to discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, age, and disability. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
prohibits employment discrimination by private employers and the federal
government on the basis of all of the above categories but does not protect
against discrimination based upon sexual orientation.26 The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, charged with the enforcement of Title VII, has
refused jurisdiction over sexual orientation discrimination charges.2 7 Further,
23. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 411 (1988) (providing veterans' benefits to surviving spouses
upon the death of a veteran spouse); 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1988) (providing medicare benefits to
spouses of those insured, once the insured reaches age 62); McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d
54, 56 (8th Cir. 1976) (denying veterans' benefits on the grounds that same-sex marriages
were prohibited under state law); THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15,
at 93; OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, CATALOG OF FEDERAL DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE
613, 615, 1119-22 (1994); Stoddard, supra note 3, at 15.
24. THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 86-87; Rivera, supra
note 5, at 874.
25. See generally THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 16-30
(addressing violations of the right to equal employment opportunities and restricted access to
occupational licensing, and noting that the law offers little protection against discrimination
based on sexual orientation).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (equal employment opportuni-
ty statute does not extend rights to gays or lesbians); Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (no mention of gays or lesbians in stat-
ute); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-960 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (no mention
of gays or lesbians as protected under the statute); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608
F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979) (Title VII prohibition of "sex" discrimination does not include
protection of sexual preference); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326-27 (5th
Cir. 1978) (Title VII allows discrimination based on affectional or sexual preference);
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) (discharging em-
ployee for having a sex change does not violate Title VII); Rivera, supra note 5, at 464-65
(noting unsuccessful attempts by gays to have sexual orientation considered under Title VII).
See generally I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1158 (1991).
Lesbian and gay rights supporters have sought passage of a national gay-rights bill
that has been repeatedly introduced in Congress since 1975. H.R. 423, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993). If passed, the Civil Rights Amendment Act of 1993 would have amended existing
civil-rights legislation to prohibit private discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See
Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1905, 1907-08
(1993).
The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, introduced into Congress by Sena-
tor Edward Kennedy and Representatives Barney Frank and Gerry Studds, would prohibit
employers from subjecting employees to different standards or treatment, or otherwise dis-
criminating in employment on the basis of sexual orientation. NCLR is Following ENDA's
Progress, NCLR NEWSL. (Nat'l Ctr. For Lesbian Rights, San Francisco, CA), Fall 1994, at
3.
27. 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 919 6493, 6495 (1976). For an in-depth analysis of
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gay and lesbian employees or prospective employees have found little success
in the courts when claiming substantive Constitutional protections such as ra-
tional basis review,2" or the First Amendment.29
6. Insurance Discrimination
As a further inequality, employer-provided health insurance almost always
excludes unmarried partners, but normally covers spouses." For gay and les-
bian employees, the result is total compensation lower than that of married co-
workers performing the same job.3' Same-sex couples also suffer diminished
employment benefits due to marital biases built into bereavement leave and
pension plans.32 Similar invidious discrimination exists in workers compensa-
tion schemes that provide benefits for "dependents" of covered employees.33
Courts generally refuse to recognize the right of a cohabitant to receive work-
ers compensation benefits unless the cohabitant is the covered employee's
legal spouse.'
7. Private Organization Discrimination
Same-sex couples also are subject to discriminatory treatment by private
organizations. Lesbian and gay couples are normally precluded from special
club membership rates,33 home and automobile insurance rates,36 and family
litigation of employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, see Rivera, supra
note 2, at 465-540.
28. Singer v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 255 (9th Cir. 1976),
vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at 1557-64.
29. Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at 1571-
73, 1586-02.
30. See, e.g., Stoddard, supra note 3, at 15; Tamar Lewin, Suit Over Death Benefits
Asks, What Is Family?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1990, at B7 (reporting that a lesbian denied
death benefits for her deceased partner is suing AT&T for the benefits).
31. Robert L. Eblin, Note, Domestic Partnership Recognition in the Workplace: Equita-
ble Employee Benefits for Gay Couples (and Others), 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1067 (1990). This
note examines some of the inequalities between married and same-sex employees. Id. at
1069. It refers to Bureau of Labor Statistics in pointing out that employee benefits average
more than twenty-seven percent of total compensation for employees in the private sector. Id.
at 1070. Insurance plans alone, of which health insurance is a major component, constitute
approximately six percent of the total compensation costs. Id. at 1070-71.
32. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION PUBLIC EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, LEGISLATIVE
BRIEFING SERIES: DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP 3 (1991) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE BRIEFING SE-
RIES]; Adrienne K. Wilson, Note, Same-Sex Marriage: A Review, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
539, 540 (1991).
33. See Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at
1618-19.
34. See, e.g., id. at 1619 (citing Donovan v. County of Los Angeles, 73 LA 385-107
(Cal. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., Opinion and Notice of Intention, Nov. 3, 1983) (holding
that a deceased employee's same-sex partner of twenty-seven years was a "good faith mem-
ber" of the employee's household and, accordingly, was entitled to workers' compensation
benefits)).
35. See, e.g., Olson v. Y.M.C.A. of Metro. Madison, No. 3110 (Madison, Wis., Equal
Opportunities Comm'n, Oct. 10, 1985) (holding that the denial of a Y.M.C.A. family mem-
bership to a lesbian couple did not violate the local Equal Opportunity Ordinance).
36. Automobile and home insurers use marital status as a premium-rating standard. See
1995]
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rates in nongovernmental medical insurance plans such as Blue Cross and
Blue Shield.37 In addition, lesbian and gay partners suffer discrimination by
hospitals with respect to medical emergencies and guardianship."
8. Housing Discrimination
Same-sex couples face substantial discrimination in their efforts to obtain
housing.39 This is attributable to exclusionary zoning laws, restrictive statu-
tory provisions, and narrow judicial constructions of the meaning of "fami-
ly.,,' Lesbian and gay couples also face discrimination in the application of
rent control and stabilization laws. For example, a person involved in a lesbian
or gay relationship is subject to eviction for failure to qualify for the right of
successorship of the named tenant upon the death of her or his cohabitant
partner, the named tenant." Same-sex couples also are subject to private dis-
THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 90-91 (noting that California,
Wisconsin, and Illinois forbid insurance carriers from discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation or marital status); Rivera, supra note 5, at 906.
37. THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 91.
38. See, e.g., 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), rev. denied, Feb. 10, 1992
(Kowalski I11); 392 N.W.2d 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), rev. denied, Oct. 17, 1986
(Kowalski I1); In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1085 (1986) (Kowalski I); see also KAREN THOMPSON & JULIE
ANDRZEJEWSKI, WHY CAN'T SHARON KOWALSKI COME HOME? (1988).
In November 1983, Sharon Kowalski suffered severe brain damage when the car she
was driving was hit by a drunk driver. Id. at 1-8. She was unable to act on her own behalf,
causing a controversy as to who should be appointed as her guardian: Karen Thompson, her
lesbian partner of four years and the woman with whom Kowalski had exchanged rings and
named as beneficiary on her life insurance, or Kowalski's father. Kowalski 1, 382 N.W.2d at
863. After Mr. Kowalski was named guardian, he cut off Thompson's visitation rights. Id. at
864. During the course of the seven-year dispute, however, Thompson was awarded reinstate-
ment of visitation rights and eventually named Kowalski's guardian. Kowalski III, 478
N.W.2d at 791. For a synopsis of the Kowalski story, see Cameli, supra note 2, at 452-54.
39. THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 64-69; Developments
in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at 1612-18. See LEGISLATIVE
BRIEFING SERIES, supra note 32, at 3 (noting that unmarried couples are denied HUD hous-
ing).
40. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1974) (upholding an ordinance
prohibiting unrelated people from living together in certain types of housing); City of Ladue
v. Horn, 720 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding a city zoning ordinance that
defined "family" as those persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption, and thereby pre-
venting an unmarried heterosexual couple from cohabitating). But see Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 494-98 (1977) (In striking down the law, the Court distinguished
the Belle Terre ordinance as one promoting family values. In contrast, the East Cleveland
law "slic[ed] deeply into the family itself," because it limited occupancy of a dwelling to
immediate family so as to prevent a grandmother from living with her son and grandson and
his cousin.).
41. See, e.g., N.Y. CITY UNCONSOL. LAW § 2204.6(d) (McKinney 1987) (providing that
no occupant of housing shall be evicted if the occupant is either the surviving spouse of the
deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased tenant's family who has been living
with the tenant); Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 544 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that
the above provision does not extend to a same-sex partner); East 10th St. Assocs. v. Estate
of Goldstein, 552 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258-59 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (eviction protection status
was not presumed until there was a showing of "two adult lifetime partners whose relation-
ship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interde-
[Vol. 72:2
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crimination in housing due to homophobia on the part of landlords, and to
restrictive agreements on the part of condominium and homeowner associa-
tions.42 Finally, same-sex couples may be denied a mortgage because many
banks and savings and loan associations view lesbians and gay men as
uncreditworthy due to their unorthodox life-styles.43
B. Upon Dissolution
Lesbian and gay couples, unlike their married counterparts, do not have a
set of laws governing the division of property or providing for support pay-
ments upon the dissolution of their relationship.' Nor may they take advan-
tage of community property laws in states under the community property
system because community property applies only to married couples.45 Fur-
ther, a gay or lesbian partner may be subject to gift tax for making support
payments or dividing shared property depending on the amount, circumstances,
and original contribution towards the particular divided asset.'
C. Upon Death
As mentioned above, same-sex couples are subject to higher taxes upon
the death of a partner than are married couples upon the death of a spouse.4
Lesbian women and gay men may not avail themselves of the marital deduc-
tion or the right to election, and therefore must pay higher estate or gift tax-
pendence"). For a general discussion of Braschi, see William B. Rubenstein, We Are Family:
A Reflection on the Search for Legal Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Relationships, 8 J.L.
& POL. 89, 95-97 (1991).
42. See The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988) (prohibiting discrimination in
renting or selling housing units on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
but not on the basis of sexual orientation); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-502, 24-34-601
(1988 & Supp. 1994) (prohibiting discrimination in housing and places of public accommoda-
tion, respectively); THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 68 (airing
the pessimistic view that "there is little a lesbian or gay man can do to challenge an
owner's refusal to sell to him or her, unless there is a statute specifically outlawing housing
discrimination on account of sexual orientation"); Developments in the Law-Sexual Orienta-
tion and the Law, supra note 6, at 1615-17; Note, The Rule of Law in Residential Associa-
tions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 472, 473 (1985) (homeowner associations exercise great control
over the people within their boundaries, including unrelated cohabitants).
43. THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 67. But see Equal
Credit Opportunity Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 1691, (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting
discrimination in granting credit on the basis of sex or marital status).
44. THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 87; Heeb, supra note
3. at 352; see Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAKE
L. REV. 311, 325 (1980-81) (acknowledging the absence of statutes or legal procedures that
ensure fair treatment between same-sex partners upon separation).
45. THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 87.
46. See Bruce Wolk, Federal Tax Consequences of Wealth Transfers Between Unmar-
ried Cohabitants, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1240, 1263 (1980) (noting the tax law's distinction be-
tween status and contract in the context of marital dissolution). In Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S.
151 (1917), the Supreme Court held that alimony did not constitute taxable income because
it was "not founded on a contract, express or implied, but on a natural and legal duty of
the husband to support the wife." Id. at 153; see infra note 169 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note II and accompanying text.
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es.48 Moreover, lesbians and gay men are burdened by the necessity of pre-
paring wills or establishing trusts if they want to assure a distribution of their
assets upon death in a manner different from that set out in the intestate stat-
ute of the decedent's resident state.49 That is, if lesbians or gay men want
their partners to inherit any part of their estate, they must specifically arrange
for the transfer by a proper legal device.5" Finally, same-sex couples are ex-
posed to discrimination when arranging funerals for deceased companions.5
48. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. I.R.C. § 2523 (West 1994) provides
for special treatment with regard to gifts between spouses. Combined with § 2056, § 2523
enables married couples to pass substantial sums of wealth between spouses and then to
survivors. I.R.C. § 2056 (West 1994).
49. Intestacy laws control the distribution of a decedent's property when a person dies
without a will. GENERAL PRACTICE SECTION, AM. BAR Ass'N, ALL-STATES WILLS AND Es-
TATE PLANNING GUIDE 1-1 (1993 ed.) [hereinafter ALL-STATES PLANNING GUIDE] (this guide
includes a state-by-state survey of intestate descent and distribution provisions). "State law
directs the distribution of the decedent's property to his or her heirs and, in effect writes the
will the decedent failed to make." Id. In most states, the surviving spouse inherits a portion
of the estate, or "a fixed sum plus a percentage share of the balance." Id. Surviving children
receive the remainder of the estate in equal shares. Id. "Issue of a deceased child inherit the
share their parent would have received if the parent survived." Id. "Descendants . . . take in
preference of other blood relatives." Id. In the absence of descendants, parents normally take
subject to a surviving spouse's share; then siblings, then nephews and nieces, and so forth.
Id. at 1-2. See THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 87-89.
50. See HAYDEN CURRY & DENIS CLIFFORD, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY
COUPLES 9:1 (6th ed. 1991). The authors describe the plight of a gay man whose lover died
intestate. Id. at 9:1. The decedent's family quickly appeared and started removing property
from the couple's apartment. Id. "His mother took the pillows and pillowcases off the bed,"
the lover said, remarking that he had to fight for his own clothes because they wore the
same size. Id. at 9:1-9:2. Note, however, that having a will is no guarantee that a substantial
bequest to a gay lover will be respected by the courts. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue
hIfluence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PIrr. L. REv. 225, 266-67 (1981) (attributing
the phenomenon of same-sex couples' greater risk of having testamentary plans overturned to
homophobia in the courts and in the families of the testators); Cameli, supra note 2, at 464
n.124 (noting that when Gertrude Stein died, her life-companion was left penniless despite
Stein's vast estate); infra notes 77, 97, 119, 137 and accompanying text.
51. See Stewart v. Schwartz Bros.-Jeffer Memorial Chapel, Inc., 606 N.Y.S.2d 965
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993). Stewart is an exceptional decision allowing a gay domestic partner
of a deceased AIDS victim to enjoin funeral plans by the decedent's family. Id. at 966.
Because the partner of the decedent had been named executor of the will, the court found
that the partner had standing as a representative of the estate. Id. at 968. The decision stated
that "the close, spousal-like relationship that existed between the plaintiff and his 'significant
other' and the strained relationship between [the decedent] and his family in the years prior
to death support the plaintiffs standing as a representative of [the decedent's] wishes." Id.
The decision goes on to note that the plaintiff was not a mere stranger or intermeddler, "but
was a lover and companion of the decedent for over five years," and that he was "attempt-
ing to carry out the final wishes of the person with whom he was building a future." Id.
The fact, however, that the will was silent on the matter of funeral arrangements put a sub-
stantial burden on the plaintiff. Id. See also Significant Others: Gay Partner Claims Burial
Rights, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1993, at 86.
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II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF HOMOSEXUAL MARRIAGE
As the United States Supreme Court has firmly acknowledged,
"[m]arriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of [women and men],' fundamental
to our very existence and survival." 2 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, state
laws that restrict fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny.53 Neverthe-
less, the basic civil right of marriage is subject to the control of state legisla-
tive bodies' and no state, nor the District of Columbia, has legalized same-
sex marriage." The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the legiti-
52. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942)); see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1987) (striking down a law
limiting prisoners' freedom to marry); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382 (1978) (find-
ing unconstitutional a state statute that required parents under child support obligations to
meet certain financial requirements as a prerequisite to marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (describing the right to marry as older than the Bill of Rights),
see also Heeb, supra note 3, at 347 n. I.
53. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (fundamental liberties
may not "be abridged by the states simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some
rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose"); Developments in the
Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at 1605-11 (exploring the constitutional
right of gay and lesbian couples to marry and state justifications for prohibiting same-sex
marriage).
54. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888); see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404
(1975) (recognizing state regulation of the marital relationship); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 734-35 (1877) (acknowledging the state's absolute right "to prescribe both the condi-
tions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the
reasons for which it may be dissolved"). Note that so long as each state recognizes marriag-
es performed in other states, if a single state allowed for same-sex marriages, lesbian and
gay couples could get married in that state and then return home as married couples assum-
ing their home state does not change its current recognition of marriages from other states.
See infra text accompanying note 62.
Colorado has a statute that, like most other states, simply adopts the language of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-112 (1987) ("All marriages
contracted . ..outside this state that were valid at the time of the contract or subsequently
validated by the laws of the place in which they were contracted or by the domicile of the
parties are valid in this state."). COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-110 (1987), entitled "Prohibited
marriages," does not address marriages between parties of the same sex, concerning itself
instead with polygamy and consanguinity. See id.
55. Jean Patteson, Gay Couples Seek Benefits, Acceptance of Marriage, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
19, 1993, at 5; For Gays, Wedding Bells May Soon Ring, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 1993, at 62;
see, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
810 (1972); DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 956 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Singer v. Hara,
522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, that the
right to privacy did not prevent states from criminalizing same-sex sexual activity. Id. at
190. Bowers gives states another line of defense against arguments that they should be com-
pelled to legalize same-sex marriage. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 18 Fam. L. Rep.
(BNA) 1381, 1387-88 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1992) (stating that "legislative authorization of homo-
sexual, same-sex marriages would constitute tacit state approval of the sexual conduct, to wit,
sodomy, commonly associated with homosexual status-conduct deemed by society to be so
morally reprehensible as to be a criminal offense in the District of Columbia and many other
jurisdictions"). Currently, twenty-three states have valid criminal sodomy statutes. Sherry
Jacobson, Hawaii Debates Gay Marriages: State May Recognize Such Unions After Court
Ruling, Pair's Bias Suit, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 17, 1993, at IA; Trosino, supra
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macy of same-sex marriage, and has declined the opportunity to do so for lack
of federal question jurisdiction.56
A. Recent Cases
Several recent decisions concerning the issue of same-sex marriage shed
new light on the controversy.57 In Dean v. District of Columbia,55 the court
rejected a due process claim brought by two men seeking a marriage license.
The court stated that "[t]he true due process inquiry involves not the funda-
mental nature of an abstract 'right to marry,' but rather, whether the constitu-
tion confers a fundamental right upon persons of the same sex to marry one
another."59 The due process claim failed because gay marriage was not a
right "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," nor "deeply rooted in the
nation's history."'
Proponents of same-sex marriage gained significant ground in Hawaii,
where the state's supreme court held in Baehr v. Lewin6 that a state statute
prohibiting same-sex marriage may violate the state constitution's equal pro-
tection clause. Hawaii's equal protection clause is more elaborate than the
federal counterpart, providing that no person shall be denied equal protection
or be discriminated against in the exercise of civil rights on the basis of, inter
alia, "sex."6 2 The majority of the Baehr court held marriage was a protected
note 20, at 117 n.160.
While only a few states expressly prohibit same-sex marriage, the absence of a statute
has not prevented courts from construing marriage laws to preclude them. See, e.g., Adams
v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982) (construing
Colorado law and noting that even if same-sex marriages were valid under state law, federal
law may not recognize them as having "spouse status."); Eblin, supra note 31, at 1068 n.10.
56. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
810 (1972); see also Mary Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of Family, 26
GONZ. L. REV. 91, 107 (1991).
57. See Rubenstein, supra note 41 (this article, written by the Director of the American
Civil Liberties Union Lesbian and Gay Rights Project, gives a thorough overview of several
of the more prominent decisions in the area of gay rights).




61. 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
62. Id. at 59-60. Hawaii left an opening for same-sex marriages in 1984, when its
legislature changed the definition of marriage by deleting the word "procreation" as the pur-
pose of marriage in order to accommodate elderly couples seeking marriage. Jacobson, supra
note 57, at IA; see Jane Gross, After a Ruling, Hawaii Weighs Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES,
April 25, 1994, at Al (observing that Hawaii-known for its progressive public policy and
tolerance for diversity-has a constitution that "is more elaborate than its Federal counterpart
and explicitly prohibits sex discrimination"); Jeffrey Schmalz, In Hawaii, Step Toward Legal-
ized Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1993, at A14 (Schmalz notes that while no state
currently allows same-sex marriages, each state recognizes marriages performed in another
state. "Thus, unless other states acted to change current practices, gay couples married in Ha-
waii would have to be recognized as married couples in other states, thereby entitling them
to the tax breaks, health benefits and survivoi benefits that accrue to married partners.").
For a more involved discussion of nationwide recognition and the application of the Full
Faith and Credit clause to same-sex marriages, see Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and
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civil right and that discrimination on the basis of sex warrants strict scruti-
ny.63 The court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing at which the
state must offer the most compelling reasons for refusing to permit lesbian and
gay couples to marry.'
Finally, in the federal case of Shahar v. Bowers, a district court stated that
the plaintiffs "relationship with her female partner constitutes a constitutional-
ly-protected association."" Although the plaintiff technically lost her unem-
ployment discrimination suit against the Georgia Attorney General Michael
Bowers after he learned she was planning to marry another woman and with-
drew her job offer, the decision is viewed by gay rights activists as a legal
victory.' According to a director of the Lesbian and Gay Rights Project of
the American Civil Liberties Union, the "terminology used in this opinion is
unprecedented [and] a major victory for gay and lesbian rights."67
B. Colorado and Amendment 2
On November 3, 1993, by a vote of 53.4% to 46.6%, Colorado voters
passed an amendment to the Colorado Constitution referred to as Amendment
2.68 The amendment not only attempted to repeal existing state laws that pro-
Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?
1994 Wisc. L. REV. 1033; Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages Be Recognized in
Sister States?: Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States' Choice of
Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii's Baehr
v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 551 (1994); Joseph W. Hovermill, A Conflict of
Laws and Morals: The Choice of Law Implications of Hawaii's Recognition of Same-Sex
Marriages, 53 MD. L. REV. 450 (1994); Thomas M. Keane, Note, Aloha, Marriage? Consti-
tutional and Choice of Law Arguments for Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 499 (1995).
63. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
64. Id.; see Notebook-Here Comes the Groom, 22 THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 31, 1993,
at II; see also Gross, supra note 62, at AI (surveying the responses to Baehr by Hawaii's
legislators, Attorney General, gay community, tourism industry, and national conservative
groups); Jacobson, supra note 55, at IA (The plaintiffs identified more than 200 rights and
benefits in the state code that are denied gay couples because they are not allowed to many.
The entitlements afforded by the state to married couples range from tax breaks to lower
rates on hunting licenses.).
65. 836 F. Supp. 859, 863 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
66. Mark Curriden, Lesbian Loses Job Bias Suit, A.B.A. J. Jan. 1994, at 27.
67. Id. "Shahar claimed that [Bower's] decision violated her rights to free association,
religion, and equal protection." Id. First Amendment experts project an ultimate victory for
Shahar because the government must show a compelling interest before it can interfere with
the right of association. Id. According to First Amendment attorney Bruce Fein, the
"marriage itself was not a homosexual act" of the type prohibited by Bowers v. Hardwick.
Id.
68. Amendment 2 provides:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of, or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status
or claim discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects
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tected gay people from discrimination, but also attempted to ban all future
laws that would recognize such claims by lesbians and gay men.6 On De-
cember 11, 1994, the Colorado Supreme Court found the amendment unconsti-
tutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution." Colorado is the first state to witness a successful effort on the
part of right-wing, fundamentalist Christian groups to restrict the rights of
lesbians and gay men, but similar campaigns have been started in at least eight
other states.71
In discussing the tax planning measures available to same-sex couples, it
is necessary to look at the underlying state substantive law in order to discern
the federal tax ramifications. Because Colorado has taken the unfortunate
position as the bellwether state on the issue of anti-gay-rights initiatives, this
article will apply Colorado law as the default, pointing out other state laws
when relevant.7"
self-executing.
COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 30(b) (permanently enjoined from enforcement by Evans v. Romer,
882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 1994 WL 706873 (Feb. 21, 1995).
69. Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, supra note 26, at 1905; Trosino,
supra note 20, at 99-100 (comparing the prejudices against same-sex marriages and arguing
that white supremacists in the post-Civil War Era maintained the "status quo by emphasizing
the handful of social effects" that could result from granting equal rights to such groups).
70. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 1994 WL 706873
(Feb. 21, 1995). The court reaffirmed its earlier decision requiring strict scrutiny review. Id.
at 1341. This previous decision was an appeal from the state challenging a preliminary in-
junction issued by a district court judge. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1274 (Colo.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993). At trial, the state had to show that Amendment
2's infringement on the fundamental right to participate equally in the political process was
in support of a compelling state interest narrowly drawn to achieve that purpose in the least
restrictive manner possible. Id. at 1275. The court held that the state failed to meet its bur-
den. 1I. at 1286. The Colorado Supreme Court stated:
Amendment 2 expressly fences out an independently identifiable group ...
Amendment 2 singles out that class of persons (namely gay men, lesbians, and
bisexuals) who would benefit from laws barring discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation. No other identifiable group faces such a burden-no other group's
ability to participate in the political process is restricted and encumbered in a like
manner. Such a structuring of the political process undoubtedly is contrary to the
notion that "[tihe concept of 'we the people' under the Constitution visualizes no
preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic qualifica-
tions."
Id. at 1285 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963)).
71. See Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, supra note 26, at 1905-06;
Tamar Lewin, Sights Are Set on Other Anti-Gay Measures, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 1993, at
A22. Amendment 2 was sponsored by Colorado for Family Values, a group associated with
the right-wing Christian fundamentalist movement. Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay Rights
Initiatives, supra note 26, at 1905 n.6. Similar groups have begun to rally behind parallel
state constitutional amendments in Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, Ohio, Ore-
gon, and Washington. Id. at 1906 n.9. On April 12, 1995, an Oregon appellate court upheld
a 1993 law designed to invalidate local anti-gay rights ordinances in 27 cities and counties.
DeParrie v. State, 1995 WL 217945 (Or. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 1995); Charles E. Beggs, Court
Backs Nullifying of Anti-Gay Laws, DENV. POST, Apr. 13, 1995, at 5A.
72. The author makes his home in Boulder, Colorado, one of the cities that has a law
prohibiting discrimination against gay men and lesbians in housing and employment. See
BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE § 12 (1981).
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III. OPTIONS AND STRATEGIES
"Marriage provides the ultimate form of acceptance for personal, intimate
relationships in our society, and gives those who marry an insider status of the
most powerful kind.""' For same-sex couples, who are denied such insider
status, the discrimination translates into a variety of disadvantages, including
higher taxes. To combat that situation, same-sex couples have looked to the
advantages of not having their relationship defined by law and entered into
relationships the terms of which they define themselves.
There are many mechanisms for creating legal relationships outside of
marriage, and this section will explore some of them while focussing on the
tax considerations. Defining a same-sex relationship according to a couple's
desires, structuring it to circumvent various legal constraints, and adapting it to
anticipate the tax ramifications requires a somewhat comprehensive approach.
A well-planned legal relationship involves strategies for cohabitation, finance,
property ownership, parenting, insurance, pensions, medical emergencies,
dissolution, support, incapacity, death, and estates.
A. Living Together Contracts and Similar Arrangements
The Human Rights issue we are concerned about here
is the fundamental freedom of every human being, man or
woman, gay or straight, to form primary relationships, to
fall in love, to develop relationships of caring that may or
may not involve parenting, to make commitments to one
another, and to have those relationships treated with re-
spect and dealt with equitably by the law.74
Same-sex couples are able to construct their own legal relationships
through bilateral contracts that define the rights, duties, obligations, responsi-
bilities, and other parameters of the relationship. The parties have tremendous
flexibility in deciding how comprehensive they want the contract to be and, as-
suming they are carefully drafted, these contracts will be respected by the
courts." Cohabitation agreements can either be express, implied, or structured
73. Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in LESBIAN
AND GAY MARRIAGE 20 (Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992). In contrast to the tone expressed in
the quoted passage, Ettelbrick argues that the institution of marriage, which is "[slteeped in a
patriarchal system that looks to ownership, property, and dominance of men over women as
its basis," will constrain lesbian and gay relationships. Id. She contends that same-sex mar-
riage would undermine the purpose of the gay-rights movement and begin a process of si-
lencing the gay voice because lesbian and gay couples would then be forced to assimilate
into the mainstream. Id. at 21. For a related discussion, see infra notes 234-39 and accompa-
nying text.
74. San Francisco Supervisor Harry Britt, quoted in LEGISLATIVE BRIEFING SERIES,
supra note 32, at I.
75. In the notorious decision Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (1976), the California
Supreme Court proclaimed, "the judicial barriers that may stand in the way of a policy
based upon the fulfillment of the reasonable expectation of the parties to a nonmarital rela-
tionship should be removed." Id. at 122. For the most part, they have. See Whorton v.
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into a form such as domestic partnership. These arrangements may involve
joint bank accounts, joint ownership of property, parenting arrangements, or
strategies for handling future contingencies.76
1. Express Pooling Agreements
A pooling agreement is an arrangement by which lesbian and gay couples
agree to share whatever income both parties receive while neither party is
required to perform any services for the other. Pooling agreements have a
number of drawbacks from a tax perspective.77
First, although this type of contract parallels a marital arrangement, it does
not entitle the parties to file a joint income tax return because they will not
qualify as "husband and wife.""8 Further, even though one party in a lesbian
or gay relationship is sharing all her or his earnings with the other, she or he
must recognize the full amount of that income on her or his separate tax return
due to the assignment of income principle.79
Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 409 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (construing a two party contract,
the court ruled that the inference to sex-using the term lover-could be deleted and the
contract enforced); Latham v. Latham, 547 P.2d 144, 148 (Or. 1976) (holding that an agree-
ment by unmarried cohabitants was not void as against public policy). In the Latham agree-
ment, the consideration was not restricted to sexual intercourse, but incorporated all the bur-
dens and amenities of married life. Id. at 147. See also Koslowski v. Koslowski, 403 A.2d
902, 906 (N.J. 1979) (upholding an agreement between unmarried cohabitants when the ar-
rangement was not explicitly founded on sexual services); CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note
50, at 2:2-2:4; THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 82-85; SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, § 3.04[21[b] (Roberta Achtenberg, ed. 1993); Cameli, supra
note 2, at 458-62; Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6,
at 1624-26. But see Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal.Rptr. 130, 133 (Ca. Ct. App. 1981) (refusing to
uphold a gay living-together contract because it explicitly referred to rendering services as a
lover in exchange for property, and was, therefore, an agreement for prostitution).
76. See Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at
1623-24 (noting that "same-sex couples have employed a number of legal mechanisms to
circumvent the barriers posed by state laws").
77. There are also negative bankruptcy problems associated with pooling agreements, but
they go beyond the scope of this article. For a general discussion of the tax aspects, see
Mary Wenig, Marital Status and Taxes, in UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE LAW 189 (Gra-
ham Douthwaite ed., 1979). For a bankruptcy analysis, see William A. Reppy, Jr., Property
and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status,
44 LA. L. REV. 1677, 1699-04 (1984).
78. I.R.C. § 6013(a) (West 1994).
79. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). Lucas involved a pooling agreement be-
tween a wife and husband. Id. at 113-14. The Supreme Court held that the husband was
taxable on the whole of his income because a salary earner may not shift the tax burden to
another by assigning the right to receive income through anticipatory arrangements and con-
tracts. Id. at 114-15; see also United States v. Bayse, 410 U.S. 441, 447 (1973) (holding
that contributions to a retirement fund were taxable income for a medical partnership);
Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122, 124 (1940) (holding that the assignment of future in-
come was taxable to the assignor in the year of payment); Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Cou-
ples and the Federal Tax Laws, I L. & SEXUALITY 97, 109-23 (1991) (providing an in-
depth discussion of the assignment of income principle as it applies to same-sex couples
entering into income sharing agreements). Cain offers a concrete example of how Lucas
applies to a same-sex couple and suggests a way of planning around the assignment of
income problem through a compensation arrangement. Id. at 120-23. Further, Cain proposes
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Pooling agreements have another negative tax aspect: when one party
receives more income than the other, and pooling causes a net transfer of
income to the party with less income, that transfer may be treated as a taxable
gift." Thus the greater income earner is subject to double taxation: once
when the income is earned, and again on the net amount that is treated as a
gift.s' The amount received by the transferee is excluded from gross income.
If the net transfer is not treated as a gift, 2 the lower income earner in the
pooling agreement will be taxed under the Code's broad definition of gross
income from the net transfer. s3
an alternative to the assignment of income principle that uses support payments and taxes
the recipient partner instead of the partner earning the larger income. Id; see also SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, at 3-15 to 3-17; RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL.,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION I 10.01[10][al (6th ed. 1991) (discussing the assign-
ment of income as the "well-known income tax 'fruit' from the "tree" of Justice Holmes'
opinion in Lucas and exploring the overlap and clashes between the gift tax and the income
tax); Reppy, Jr., supra note 77, at 1694; Wolk, supra note 46, at 1244.
80. To the extent the net transfer from the greater income earner to the lower income
earner is viewed as being paid in consideration for the lower income earner's love, emotion-
al support, or other services upon which a monetary value may not be placed, the transfer is
a gift. The services are not an obligation that can be valued in "money's worth" under
I.R.C. § 2514 and, therefore, the payment will be treated as a gift. I.R.C. § 2514 (West
1994); see STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, I 10.01; Wenig, supra note 77, at 197, 201.
81. Only the net amount of the pooled income in excess of $10,000 per year will be a
taxable gift. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (West 1994). For an in-depth discussion of the gift tax con-
sequences of express pooling agreements, see Cain, supra note 79, at 114-16, 124-29; Wolk,
supra note 46, at 1275-90.
82. For federal gift tax purposes, a gift is a transfer of property "for less than an ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth." I.R.C. § 2512(b) (West 1994).
The amount of the gift is the difference between the value of the property transferred and
the consideration received. Id.; see Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992) (excluding
from the gift tax transfers made in the ordinary course of business, defined as a "transaction
which is bona fide, at arm's length, and free from any donative intent"). The definition for
gift tax purposes, unlike that for income tax purposes, uses an objective standard, thus ren-
dering the transferor's motivation irrelevant. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1) (as amended in
1986). As a result, the presence of consideration sufficient to make a promised transfer en-
forceable for state contract law purposes will not necessarily prevent some part of the trans-
fer from being a gift. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-384, 1979-2 C.B. 344. Accordingly, a wealth
transfer between same-sex partners will constitute a gift for gift tax purposes unless the
transferor receives consideration having an economic value equal to the property transferred.
Wolk, supra note 46, at 1276-77.
Gift taxes are normally payable by the donor. I.R.C. § 2502(c) (West 1994). If the
tax is not paid when due, the donee becomes personally liable for the tax to the extent of
the value of the gift. I.R.C. § 6324(b) (West 1994). Because the definition of "gift" is dif-
ferent for income and gift purposes, it is technically possible for a transfer to be considered
a gift under I.R.C. § 2512(b), but not a gift under the income tax definition. In that case,
the transfer would be subject to both gift and income taxation. See Commissioner v. Beck's
Estate, 129 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1942); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7921012 (Feb 16, 1979); Cain supra
note 79, at 124-25.
83. I.R.C. § 61(a) (West 1994) defines gross income as "all income from whatever
source derived." In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955), the
Supreme Court held that income includes "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized,
and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion." Moreover, regulations provide that
gross income includes income realized in any form, such as money, cash, services, property,
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In Commissioner v. Duberstein,' the Supreme Court held that a gift un-
der section 102 of the Internal Revenue Code must proceed from "detached
and disinterested generosity" prompted by "affection, respect, admiration,
charity or like impulses."85 This requires the motive for a transfer be ascer-
tained in order to determine whether the transfer qualifies as a gift. It is easy
to say a transfer from one lesbian or gay partner to the other is motivated out
of affection, respect and the like, but whether the transfer proceeded from
detached and disinterested generosity poses a more complicated question.
The facts surrounding a same-sex couple's relationship will be crucial to
the determination of motive, and one of the most important factors will be the
terms of the pooling agreement. In the case of a living-together contract con-
taining a reciprocal agreement to provide services and share property, the
Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") will take the position that the transfer
constitutes the purchase of companionship such that it is not a gift, but taxable
compensation to the recipient. 6 As a result of this quid pro quo agreement
the parties are treated as being engaged in an employer-employee relationship.
Complications arise when the amount of the transfer exceeds the fair market
value of the services rendered. The payments must be bifurcated as compensa-
tion for the fair market value of the services and gift for the remainder. 7
Whether the net transfer through a pooling agreement of a same-sex cou-
ple with income differentials is compensation or gift could have significant tax
ramifications. Characterization of the wealth or property transfer as a gift
normally results in less aggregate tax paid by the lesbian or gay couple 8 than
it would if the transfer is compensation for services.8 9
meals, and accommodations. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1993). However, I.R.C. § 102 (West
1994) excludes from gross income the value of property acquired by gift.
84. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
85. Id. at 285 (quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956), and Robert-
son v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952)).
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(a)(1) (1993); see, e.g., Jones v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1323 (1977) (finding that a taxpayer who claimed both that she was a "kept woman"
and that amounts received from a married man were gifts was receiving compensation");
Brizendine v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 149 (1957) (finding promise to give compan-
ionship constituted sufficient consideration to negate classification of the payments as gifts);
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, 9 10.01121[g] (because the gift tax applies only to transfers
of property under I.R.C. § 2501, the gratuitous performance of services does not qualify for
gift tax treatment).
87. There is also the problem of the uncertain value of the imputed compensation for
the homemaker services, especially given the lack of an "arm's length" business transaction.
See Wolk, supra note 46, at 1251-52 ("Given this inherent uncertainty in valuation and the
fact that the parties have entered into a formal agreement, doubts may well be resolved
against the taxpayer. ... ).
88. Only amounts greater than $10,000 will be subject to tax at the transferor's tax
rate. 1.R.C. § 2503(b) (West 1994).
89. The entire net transfer would be counted as income and taxed at the transferee's
rate. In addition, the transferee would have to pay self-employment Social Security and hos-
pital taxes of approximately fifteen percent. I.R.C. §§ 1401(a)-(b), 1402(a)(12) (West 1994).
If the partner providing the services is hired as an "employee," then half of the Social Secu-
rity and hospital tax will be paid by the employer partner who may deduct those tax pay-
ments. I.R.C. §§ 3101, 3111 (West 1994).
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A possible advantage of a pooling agreement in a situation where one
partner provides services for the other in return for support is the availability
of deductions for personal exemptions. The Code provides a deduction for
personal exemptions for unrelated dependents for whom the taxpayer provides
over half the support during the year, if the dependent is a member of the
taxpayer's household and the dependent's gross income is less than the exemp-
tion amount.90 Note, however, that this provision is denied if the relationship
between the taxpayer and the dependent violates local law.9 Therefore, the
dependency exemption may be unavailable in states that still have anti-sodomy
laws on their books.92
If pooling agreements are drafted such that the net transfer from the high-
er income earner to the lower income earner is treated as an advance that is
repaid-say, when one partner in a lesbian or gay relationship is supporting
the other through school and the student promises to repay the advancements
when she or he graduates and is gainfully employed-the couple will be treat-
ed as being involved in a debtor-creditor relationship.93 These loan transac-
If, however, the gay or lesbian relationship revolves around a business such that the
net transfer qualifies as deductible compensation expenses for either the business or the trans-
feror, the compensation alternative may be more favorable. Further, if the amounts transferred
are less than the current taxable floor of $ 6,050 (zero-bracket amount of individual deduc-
tion plus personal exemption), the couple may fare well under the compensation outcome.
I.R.C. §§ 63(d)(2), 151(b) (West 1994); see I.R.C. § 119 (West 1994); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.119-
l(a)(l), (b), (c) (as amended in 1985) (excluding meals and lodging as a further reduction of
income for a homemaker-cohabitant partner). To be excluded from income pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 119, meals and lodging must be furnished on the business premises of the employer, for
the convenience of the employer, and the employee must be required to accept the meals or
lodging as a condition of her or his employment. I.R.C. § 119 (West 1994); see also Wolk,
supra note 46, at 1244-56; SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, at 3-17 to
3-21.
90. I.R.C. §§ 151(c)(1), 152(a)(9) (West 1994). In spite of the language of these sec-
tions, case law sheds some doubt on the applicability of deductions for personal exemptions
to unmarried cohabitants. Compare Hamilton v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 927, 929 (1960)
(board and lodging furnished by taxpayer in return for services is compensation, not support,
for purposes of I.R.C. § 152(a)(9) and is therefore taxable to recipient) and Angstadt v.
Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 693, 695 (1968) (medical expenses paid on behalf of an-
other are considered compensation and are therefore taxable to the recipient) with Whalen v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 611, 612 (1976) (head of household exemption is not ap-
plicable if dependent is unrelated to taxpayer).
91. I.R.C. § 152(b)(5) (West 1994).
92. But see SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.05[31[a] (main-
taining that the lesbian or gay taxpayer should take the position that the relationship is legal
even though the sexual relations are illegal); Cain, supra note 79, at 121 n.l 17 (noting that
no state has a law prohibiting same-sex cohabitation, and making the distinction between sta-
tus and conduct); Hogan, supra note 14, at 38 (discussing the "status vs. conduct" distinction
and debate, and pointing out that while laws forbidding homosexual conduct are constitution-
al on their face, the status of homosexuality cannot be forbidden).
See Ensminger v. Commissioner, 610 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1979); Shackelford v. United
States, 45 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 80-1074 (1980) (treatment of the legality of the relationship for
purposes of qualifying for the dependency exemption); Turnipseed v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.
758 (1957).
93. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, 10.01121[f] (addressing the tax treatment of
below-market interest rate loans).
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tions have several negative tax ramifications, and should be avoided unless the
loan provides for adequate stated interest and the advanced sums will be re-
paid.'
2. Domestic Partnerships
With significant changes in our family structure, rela-
tionships and social norms, we cannot afford to be inflexi-
ble in our attitudes towards individuals who do not fit
society's traditional mold. By recognizing domestic part-
nerships citywide, we are not only recognizing committed
and caring relationships among unmarried heterosexuals
and our lesbian and gay brothers and sisters, but also the
relationships and diverse living arrangements in which
many of our elderly and disabled residents are involved.
We are many families-bonded by love.95
Same-sex couples may, as an alternative to entering into an express con-
tract, register as domestic partners, assuming the availability of domestic part-
nership registration. Domestic partnership ordinances allow lesbian and gay
couples to form legal relationships entitling them to many of the affirmative
rights, privileges, and responsibilities of married couples.' However, domes-
tic partnership legislation has been restricted to the municipal level,' and
94. I.R.C. §§ 163(h), 1274, and 7872 (West 1994) combine to address below-market
interest and gift loans by imputing interest income in the amount of the applicable federal
rate to the creditor, taxing the creditor as making a gift of the interest, and denying the
debtor's interest deductions. Further, if the debtor never repays the loan, I.R.C. § 61(a)(12)
(West 1994) treats the amount advanced as income to the debtor from the discharge of
indebtedness. Note that I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2)(A) (West 1994) provides a de minimis exception
for gift loans between individuals for loans of $10,000 or less. Thus, for smaller loans there
is neither deemed interest nor a gift unless the loan is directly attributable to the purchase or
carrying of income-producing assets. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2)(B) (West 1994). See generally Treas.
Reg. § 1.61-12(a) (as amended in 1980); SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note
75, at 3-25 to 3-26; STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, 1 10.01[2][fl.
95. New York City Mayor David N. Dinkins, "Many Families, All Valued," Information
on Domestic Partnership Registration in New York City.
96. For a full discussion of domestic partnerships, see CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note
50, at 4:11-4:13; LEGISLATIVE BRIEFING SERIES, supra note 32; Vada Berger, Domestic Part-
nership hitiatives, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 417 (1991) (analyzing the protections, effectiveness,
and weaknesses of several domestic partnership initiatives); Cameli, supra note 2, at 468-77
(observing that one of the weaknesses of domestic partnership ordinances is that they are
subject to repeal efforts); Eblin, supra note 31, at 1069-86 (commenting that "[dlomestic
partnership provisions, although not a substitute for marriage, mitigate the economic discrimi-
nation otherwise suffered by gay couples," and surveying domestic partnership laws that may
benefit municipal and private employers). In light of the recent religious right-wing "pro-
family" campaigns such as those discussed in the text accompanying supra notes 71-72, this
is a very real concern.
97. See Rubenstein, supra note 41, at 93-94 (noting the fact that because domestic part-
nership laws have been enacted only at the municipal level, their ability to affect state laws
governing family and relationship rights is limited); Barbara J. Cox, Love Makes a Fami-
ly--Nothing More, Nothing Less: How the Judicial System Has Refused to Protect Nonlegal
Parents in Alternative Families, 8 J.L. & POL. 5, 65 (1991) (noting that domestic partnership
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only a limited number of municipalities nationwide have enacted domestic
partnership laws.98 Beyond providing benefits and responsibilities to munici-
pal employees, the legal status conferred by these city governments primarily
provides the private sector with a means of extending employment benefits to
same-sex couples." However, only an estimated fifty private employers in the
United States offer domestic partner benefits."
From the tax perspective, domestic partnership benefits are not very at-
tractive.'0 ' Employees must include in income the value of the benefits re-
ceived by their partners, unless their partners qualify as dependents,0 2 be-
provisions are confined to limited geographic areas); Gross, supra note 62, at B8 (discussing
the likelihood of a state-wide domestic partnership provision in Hawaii and observing that
the result of "judicial and legislative jockeying, virtually everyone agrees, will be either
legalization of gay marriage by the court or a broad domestic partnership act").
98. Among the cities that have passed domestic partnership laws are: Berkeley, Cal.;
San Francisco, Cal.; Los Angeles, Cal.; Laguna Beach, Cal.; Sacramento, Cal.; Santa Cruz,
Cal.; West Hollywood, Cal.; New York City, NY; Ithaca, NY; Madison, Wis.; Shorewood
Hills, Wis.; Seattle, Wash.; Takoma Park, Md.; Minneapolis, Minn; West Palm Beach, Fla.;
Cambridge, Mass.; Ann Arbor, Mich.; East Lansing, Mich.; and Washington, D.C.; see
Cameli, supra note 2, at 468 n.163 (citing Ann Belser, Rights, Privileges, and Gay Lovers,
THE ADVOCATE, Feb. 25, 1992, at 57); see also Eblin, supra, note 31, at 1072-77; Gross,
supra note 62, at B8 (noting that about 150 municipalities have enacted limited statutes
giving medical and other benefits to the gay partners of city employees); Schmalz, supra
note 62, at A14. The benefits and responsibilities under these ordinances vary from merely
symbolic to granting full medical insurance to partners of city employees, hospital and jail
visitation rights, and protection from housing discrimination.
99. Wilson, supra note 32, at 540; Zimmer, supra note 3, at 692.
100. Domestic Partner Programs Praised for Business Value, Yet Few Exist, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA), Jan. 18, 1994. Electronic and entertainment firms have been the quickest to
change their health care plans, arguing that they do not want to lose their productive and
creative gay and lesbian employees. Jay Mathews, Gay Partners Gain Benefits; Big Firms
Quietly Agree to Pay Medical Bills, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1993, at Al; Susan Canfield,
Defining Family Becomes More Flexible, SEATrLE TIMEs, June 14, 1993, at E3; see Sam H.
Verhovek, Texas County Retreats Over Apple's Gay Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1993, at
A18 (describing a Texas county's reversal of its initial decision not to grant Apple Computer
Corp. tax breaks because of the company's policy of granting health benefits to lesbian and
gay couples).
AIDS and the high costs of treating the illness has been a primary excuse used by
employers for not extending domestic partner benefits. Those excuses are unpersuasive, given
the figures indicating coverage for lesbian and gay domestic partners has tended to be less
expensive due to the fact that they are often younger, fewer sign up for the benefits, and
are less likely to have a pregnancy. Domestic Partner Programs Praised for Business Value
Yet Few Exist, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Jan. 18, 1994; see Jean L. Griffin, Push for Domes-
tic-Partner Benefits Picking Up Steam, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 8, 1993, at 3 (noting that the aver-
age lifetime cost of treating someone through HIV infection to death from AIDS is about
$120,000, compared with the $250,000 cost of caring for some premature babies).
101. See Berger, supra note 96, at 444-45 (concluding, however, that the value of the
benefits associated with partnership initiatives probably outweigh the negative consequences
such as an increased tax burden).
102. See I.R.C. § 105(b) (West 1994) (exempting from taxation medical benefits received
by an employee on behalf of the employee's spouse and dependents); I.R.C. § 213(a) (West
1994) (allowing as a deduction the uncompensated medical expenses of a taxpayer, spouse,
and dependents to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income);
1993 Tax Guide for Individuals, supra note 9, at 166 (stating that medical expense deduc-
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cause domestic partnerships are not recognized by the Service. 1' Neverthe-
less, domestic partnership status may give definition to the partners' financial
obligations upon dissolution for income and gift tax purposes,"° and provide
evidence of a family-type relationship for estate tax purposes.
If a lesbian or gay couple can show they are "a syndicate, group, pool,
joint venture or other unincorporated organization through or by means of
which any business, financial operation or venture is carried on," they may
establish a partnership under Subchapter K of the Code. 5 Thus, given a
good faith business venture, a same-sex couple could enter into a partnership
agreement, open a separate joint partnership account, acquire an employer's
identification number from the Service, and file partnership income tax re-
turns." 6 Partnership agreements allow for great flexibility and, assuming cer-
tain conditions are met, the lesbian or gay couple can take advantage of the
nonrecognition provisions contained in Subchapter K. 7
tions include expenses for the taxpayer, taxpayer's spouse, and children, including adopted
children). This provides an opening for the use of a domestic partnership in conjunction with
adult adoption, especially when the expenses are substantial, as in the case of AIDs. The
Tax Guide also provides for the filing of 'an amended tax return when a decedent's estate
pays unpaid medical expenses of the decedent within one year of the date of death. Id. at
169; see infra notes 146-155 and accompanying text and supra notes 90-92 and accompa-
nying text (addressing adult adoption and the use of a dependency exemption, respectively).
103. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-048 (May 29, 1990) (the Service ruled that benefits to domes-
tic partners are taxable income to the employee if the domestic partner fails to meet the
"dependent" test of I.R.C. § 152). Nonspouse cohabitants who do not receive more than fifty
percent of their support from the employee do not qualify as dependents such that benefits
extended to nonqualifying domestic partners are considered taxable fringe benefits to the
employee. Id. Those benefits are taxed at their fair market value-the amount that an indi-
vidual 'would have to pay for the particular benefit in an arm's-length transaction. Id.; see
also Eblin, supra note 31, at 1084-85; Domestic Partner Programs Praised for Business
Value, Yet Few Exist, supra note 100; Mathews, supra note 100, at Al.
See Wolk, supra note 46, at 1265-75 (suggesting that the Code be altered to take on
a more equitable domestic partnership approach for tax purposes that would give unmarried
couples who fulfilled certain requirements a status similar to that of married couples).
104. See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text; cf. I.R.C. §§ 151(c)(1), 152(a)(9)
(West 1994) (providing for a deduction for personal exemptions for unrelated dependents). A
domestic partnership agreement in which the parties agree one partner will support the other
is substantial evidence to support the dependency exemption. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.05[31[a].
105. I.R.C. § 761(a) (West 1994); see Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
In Culbertson, the Court applied the definition of "partnership" to a family partnership con-
sisting of a rancher and his sons. The focus was the intent of the parties to carry on a
business or venture for joint economic gain, to be determined in light of all the facts and
circumstances. Id.; Mary Rowland. Family Values in Estate Planning, N.Y. TIMES, April 3,
1994, § 3 at 15 (discussing the popularity of family limited partnerships as methods of
shifting assets from senior family members to younger members and quoting a Service
spokesperson as saying the Sevice considers family partnerships to be legitimate estate plan-
ning mechanisms). Under Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (as amended in 1972), a joint undertaking
merely to share expenses is not a partnership absent a business purpose.
106. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.06[51.
107. I.R.C. § 721 (West 1994) allows a partner to avoid recognizing gain or loss upon
contribution of property in exchange for a partnership interest. I.R.C. § 731 (West 1994)




Same-sex couples may opt for a less formal relationship and forego ex-
press oral or written pooling agreements and domestic partnership approaches.
Nevertheless, a lesbian or gay couple that shares income and property and
provides services for one another may avail themselves of judicially-enforce-
able property rights pursuant to implied-in-fact or implied-in-law agreements
despite the absence of contractual formalities. 8 Marvin v. Marvin"° pro-
vided a springboard for palimony remedies, such as quasi-contracts, construc-
tive or resulting trusts, or quantum meruit, in settings where unmarried cohab-
itants have no express agreements.' °
Any recovery under the application of an implied agreement theory in-
volves an explicit payment for services provided during the relationship and,
therefore, should probably be treated as taxable compensation to the recipient.
Nonetheless, the classification of income derived from Marvin-type palimony
remedies is not always easy to determine for tax purposes. In Carlson v.
Olson,"' for example, a cohabitant couple lived together for twenty-one
upon the termination of the partnership (assuming substantial economic effect), except to the
extent money is distributed in excess of the partner's basis in the partnership. Partners are
taxed on their pro rata share of partnership income pursuant to the terms of the partnership
agreement, thus avoiding the assignment of income problems of Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. Ill
(1930). See supra note 79 and accompanying text. Finally, pursuant to I.R.C. § 741 (West
1994), the character of the gain recognized when a partner sells her or his partnership inter-
est generally is considered capital gain. Capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than ordinary
income under the new tax amendments. MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX § 22.01
(1994).
108. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.05[2]. Like express agree-
ments, implied and quasi-contract theories reflect an understanding between the parties of the
same-sex couple. The difference is that the understanding is revealed in their conduct and
particular circumstances. Whether an implied agreement conveys any rights between the par-
ties for tax purposes is determined by looking at the origin of the rights under local law. Id.
For situations in which courts have failed to apply equitable remedies of implied contract,
see Estate of Alexander v. Alexander, 445 So.2d 836 (Miss. 1984) (finding no implied
agreement to co-own property); Marone v. Marone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1154-55 (N.Y. 1980)
(refusing to apply the implied contract theory as "conceptually so amorphous as practically to
defy equitable enforcement"). The problem with these implied contracts is the gift versus
income distinction, the outcome of which has been left to the courts to determine on a case-
by-case basis. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.05[2].
109. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
110. Id. at 122-23 (Cal. 1976). The court generously provided:
Our opinion does not preclude the evolution of additional equitable remedies to
protect the expectation of the parties to a nonmarital relationship in cases in which
existing remedies prove inadequate; the suitability of such remedies may be deter-
mined in later cases in light of the factual setting in which they arise.
Id. at 123 n.25.
For discussion, criticism, and analysis of Marvin v. Marvin, see SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND THE LAW, supra note 75, §§ 3.04[21[a), 3.05[21; Herma H. Kay & Carol Amyx, Marvin
v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CAL. L. REV. 937 (1977); Reppy, supra note 77, at
1682-93; Wolk, supra note 46; Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law,
supra note 6, at 1624-26.
I1I. 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977); see Case Comment, Family Law: Property, Rights of
Unmarried Cohabitants, 62 MINN. L. REV. 449 (1978) (providing an exhaustive analysis of
Carlson v. Olson).
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years, raised a son, and acquired a home and personal property. During the
relationship, Olson provided most of the income used to purchase the home
and property, which was held in joint tenancy." 2 After the relationship end-
ed, Carlson sought to partition their accumulated property."' The court relied
heavily upon Marvin in allowing an equal partition on the theory that half
constituted an irrevocable gift to Carlson "in consideration for the wifely and
motherly services she performed during the period of their cohabitation.""'
Unfortunately, the Carlson decision leaves substantial ambiguity as to the tax
treatment of Carlson's "wifely and motherly services" that were held to consti-
tute a gift."5
Recently, in Walsh v. Ray,"6 a Wisconsin appellate court affirmed a jury
award to Walsh for housework she performed during the nine years she
cohabitated with Ray. Walsh v. Ray expands upon Marvin's list of quasi-con-
tractual palimony remedies by compensating housekeeping services based on
the tort theory of unjust enrichment."7 In the past, palimony awards under
unjust enrichment normally had been restricted to quantifiable economic con-
tributions such as mortgage payments.' The court also affirmed an award
on Ray's counterclaim that Walsh was unjustly enriched by the housing he
provided to her and her children." 9
Further, in an unusual decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court applied the
theory of constructive trust as between two gay men.2 ° In that case, a gay
man in the process of divorcing his wife tried to hide assets by agreeing to
turn over funds to his male partner who used the money to purchase a house
in his own name.' 2' When the men separated shortly thereafter, the purchaser
claimed that the funds were a gift and refused to turn them over.'22 The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's finding that the purchaser
112. Carlson, 256 N.W.2d at 250.
113. id.
114. Id. at 250-55.
115. See Wolk, supra note 46, at 1259-62 (criticizing the Carlson court's failure to
"explain the trial court's paradoxical rationale of a gift in consideration" for the services
because, "[bly definition, a gift is a gratuitous transfer, without consideration"). Compare
Newsom v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1188 (1974) (in which a live-in homemaker
was characterized as "more in the nature of an employee" and taxed on the income from the
exchange of services for support even though the couple was married the following year)
with Pascarelli v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 1082 (1971) (examining the couple's relationship
and holding that it was "akin to that of husband and wife" such that the sums of money
received by the homemaker partner who performed "wifely duties" were given gift treatment
for tax purposes).
116. No. 91-1981, 1992 WL 464075 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1992) (unpublished opinion),
rev denied, 501 N.W.2d 457 (Wis. 1993). The reader should note that, as an unpublished
decision, Walsh v. Ray has no precedential value.
117. Id. at *3.
118. ArLynn L. Presser, Palimony Award for Housework, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1993, at 32.
119. Id.
120. Bramlett v. Selman, 597 S.W.2d 80 (Ark. 1980).
121. Id. at 81-82.
122. Id. at 82.
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held title to the home as a constructive trustee for his partner. 23 The sup-
reme court held that a "confidential relationship" had existed between the two
men, and that they had a fiduciary responsibility towards each other.'24 The
decision concluded that "[a]ll homosexual involvements are not as a matter of
law confidential relationships sufficient to support a constructive trust, but a
court of equity should not deny relief to a person merely because he is a ho-
mosexual." 2 '
4. Joint Accounts and Joint Ownership of Property
Sharing bank accounts and co-owning property are other common practic-
es that same-sex couples use to facilitate cohabitation.'26 Joint accounts may
be kept either for the couple's general expenses or for limited purposes, such
as household expenses, vacations, and special purchases.'27 There are no tax
ramifications as a result of creating a joint account. 2 ' Even if one partner in
a gay or lesbian couple deposits all of the money into the account from which
the other partner may draw, the Service treats the transaction as a revocable
transfer such that there is no completed gift. 29 It is only when the non-de-
positing partner withdraws an amount from the joint account for her or his
own benefit that there is a taxable gift transfer from the depositing partner to
the withdrawing partner in the amount of the withdrawal."3
When a lesbian or gay couple purchases property and takes title as joint
tenants, the partners share the property equally and each has the right to use
the entire property. 3' Joint tenants also have the right of survivorship, mean-
123. Id. at 81.
124. Id. at 84. The court reasoned that the two had been lovers for a year and had
lived together for most of that year. Id.; see also Cameli, supra note 2, at 466-67.
125. Bramletn, 597 S.W.2d at 85.
126. COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-1-109 (1992) prohibits discrimination in consumer loans on
the basis of "race, creed, religion, color, sex, marital status, national origin, or ancestry."
Sexual orientation is conspicuously absent from the list.
127. See CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 4:15. The authors suggest that couples
limit the purpose for joint accounts and that they keep adequate records. They note that both
signers on the account are responsible for all checks drawn on it, "even if your lover vio-
lates your trust, empties the account and puts the money on the nose of a slow pony." id.
The authors also addresses the use of joint charge accounts, cautioning that they are risky.
Id. at 4:16.
128. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4) (as amended in 1986) (there is a taxable gift
transfer only when a non-depository partner withdraws an amount for his/her own benefit).
129. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, 10.01[5][c]; see Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4)
(as amended in 1986) (this regulation also applies to the purchase by A of a United States
savings bond, registered as payable to "A or B," such that there is a gift to B when B
surrenders the bond for cash without any obligation to account for part of the proceeds to
A). Same-sex couples should be cautious to check their state statutes when using this joint
account strategy because some states deem the transfer as complete upon deposit. See Cain,
supra note 79, at 113 n.82 (providing examples of different state law treatments of joint ac-
counts).
130. It is at that time that the transfer is completed because the amount withdrawn pass-
es out of the depositor's control. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4) (as amended in 1986);
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, 1 10.01[511cl. Note that the amount will go untaxed if the
$10,000 tax-free gift threshold of I.R.C. § 2503(b) (West 1994) has not been surpassed.
131. CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 5:14.
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
ing that if one tenant dies, the other automatically owns both shares.'32 If one
of the joint tenants sells her or his share, the sale ends the joint tenancy such
that the original tenant and the new purchaser become tenants in common.'33
The purchase of property by a partner for herself or himself and her or his
partner as joint tenants constitutes a gift of one half the value of the proper-
ty. " There is also the possibility that income will be imputed to the pur-
chasing partner in the amount of fair market rent.
35
Joint ownership of property may result in constructive trust treatment1 36
Weeks v. Gay'.. concerned a dispute between a gay man and his deceased
partner's family over two pieces of property the men owned together. The
deceased's heirs asserted a half-interest in one of the properties that was co-
owned and a full interest in the other, which was in the decedent's name only.
A Georgia appellate court affirmed a trial court's finding that as a result of the
surviving partner's supporting the decedent and providing most of the purchase
price for the two properties, the surviving partner had an interest in the proper-
ties through an implied trust. 3
5. Children and Parenting
Although a comprehensive analysis of the range of issues relating to
same-sex couples and parenting is beyond the scope of this article,'39 it will
132. See id. at 5:14 & n.16 (pointing out the probate advantages, but warning lesbians
and gay men who own property on their own that if they put the property in joint tenancy
with their lover they will not only suffer gift tax consequences, but if the couple splits up
the original owner has no right to have the property deeded back).
133. Id. at 5:14.
134. Treas. Reg. § 25.251 1-1(h)(5) (as amended in 1986). Note that this regulation offers
a further example of discrimination against same-sex couples who do not qualify for the
exception by which a husband and wife who create either a joint tenancy with the right of
survivorship or a tenancy by the entirety are not considered to have made a transfer
includable for gift tax purposes at the time of the creation of the tenancy. Id.; see also
Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(d)-i (as amended in 1986) (marital deduction allowed for creation of
joint interest between spouses), I.R.C. § 2040(b) (West 1994) (addressing the fact that prop-
erty owned in joint tenancy by the decedent and another on the date of death generally is
included within the decedent's taxable estate and is subject to death taxes). See generally
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, 1 10.01[3][f].
135. I.R.C. § 61(a)(5) (West 1994). Alternatively, the purchasing joint tenant may be
deemed to give the non-contributing tenant a gift in the amount of the value of the rent.
The latter result is more favorable due to the $10,000 annual exclusion.
136. For the tax treatment of trusts, see infra notes 228-238 and accompanying text.
137. 256 S.E.2d 901, 902 (Ga. 1979).
138. Id. at 903-04. The supreme court stated that equity prevented the blood heirs from
a windfall recovery when the beneficial interest should flow to the partner. Id.; see Cameli,
supra note 2, at 467.
139. For discussion and analysis of issues such as adoption, children from prior relation-
ships, foster parenting, guardianships, termination of parental rights, and access to reproduc-
tive technology, see CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 6:12-7:42; Cox, supra note 97;
Elizabeth A. Delaney, Note, Statutory Protection of the Other Mother: Legally Recognizing
the Relationship Between the Nonbiological Lesbian Parent and Her Child, 43 HASTINGS L.
J. 177 (1991); Myra G. Sencer, Note, Adoption in the Non-Traditional Family-A Look at
Some Alternatives, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 191 (1987); Developments in the Law-Sexual Ori-
entation and the Law, supra note 6; Note, Looking for a Familv Resemblance: The Limits of
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touch upon some of the tax aspects of rearing children. A parent may claim an
exemption for each dependent child younger than nineteen and each child
under twenty-four who is a student during the tax year." ° The Code applies
special rules for parents who have divorced or legally separated from the other
parent of a child. 4 With certain exceptions, only a parent who has custody
of a dependent child or children for the greater portion of the year may claim
the dependency exemption.' A lesbian or gay nonbiological parent should
be able to claim the child of her or his partner if she or he provides the major-
ity of support for the child and the nonparent's home is the child's principal
residence.'43
In same-sex households, if the parent of a child provides more than half
the cost of maintaining the household and the home is the child's "principal
place of abode" for the tax year, the parent is entitled to head of household
rates.'" Head of household status permits the taxpayer to take advantage of
special tax rates, but the status is only available for unmarried individuals who
maintain their homes as households for children, stepchildren, or descend-
ants. "'45 Although a lesbian or gay male who maintains a household and sup-
the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640 (1991);
NCLR NEWSL., supra note 26, at 8-9.
140. I.R.C. § 151(c) (West 1994); see (discussion of dependency exemption deduction),
supra note 104. Exemption claims qualify for legally adopted children as well as illegitimate
children. Rev. Rul. 54-498, 1954-2 C.B. 107.
141. See I.R.C. § 152(e) (West 1994).
142. I.R.C. § 152(e)(1) (West 1994); see I.R.C. § 152(e)(2), (4) (West 1994) (granting
the dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent if the custodial parent signs a declara-
tion that he or she will not claim the child or children as dependents, or if the noncustodial
parent provides support of at least $600 per year pursuant to a pre-1985 separation instru-
ment); I.R.C. § 152(c) (West 1994) (allowing for multiple support agreements under certain
specified conditions).
143. I.R.C. § 152(a)(9) (West 1994); see Widen v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 695
(1969) (the Service allowed taxpayer's dependency exemption for child of unmarried cohabi-
tant); 1993 Tax Guide for Individuals, supra note 9, at 26-35 (outlining and explaining the
five dependency tests that must be met before a person can qualify as a dependent: (1)
member of household or relationship test; (2) citizenship test; (3) joint return test; (4) gross
income test; and (5) support test); SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, §
3.05131[bl.
144. See I.R.C. § 2(b) (West 1994).
145. I.R.C. § 2(b) (1988); see 1993 TAX GUIDE FOR INDIVIDUALS (CCH), supra note 9,
at 24. An individual qualifies for head of household status if she or he is: (1) unmarried or
considered unmarried on the last day of the year; and (2) has paid more than half the cost
of keeping up a home for her or himself and a qualifying person for more than half the
year. A taxpayer is considered unmarried on the last day of the year if she or he satisfies
all of the following requirements: (a) filed a separate return; (b) paid more than half the
cost of keeping up the home for the tax year; (c) the spouse did not live in the home dur-
ing the last 6 months of the year; and (d) the home was, for more than half the year, the
main home of child, stepchild, adopted child, or foster child whom the taxpayer may claim
as a dependent. A taxpayer will still satisfy the last test if the child cannot be claimed as a
dependent only because: (i) the taxpayer states in writing to the noncustodial parent that he
or she may claim an exemption for the child, or (ii) the noncustodial parent provides at
least $600 support for the dependent and claims an exemption for the dependent under a
pre-1985 divorce or separation agreement. Id.
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ports her or his cohabitant and the cohabitant's child may claim the child and
possibly the cohabitant as a dependent for dependency exemption purposes,
she or he will not qualify as head of household for tax purposes."4
6. Adult Adoption
One of the more creative methods by which lesbian and gay couples have
sought to obtain some of the benefits bestowed upon married couples is to
have one partner adopt the other. Adult adoption is a legal arrangement in
which a person obtains parental rights and responsibilities for another, result-
ing in an irrevocable legal union between the adopter and adoptee. 47 The
primary purpose behind adult adoption is securing inheritance rights. 4 ' Con-
sidering the failure of traditional property assignment mechanisms, such as
wills and trusts, to withstand challenges by blood relatives who claim that the
decedent's lesbian or gay partner exerted undue influence over the decedent,
the adoption strategy appears attractive. 49
Adult adoptions become final upon execution and provide an effective
means of nullifying the status as heirs of the adopter's blood relatives so that
they are without standing to contest his or her assignment of property. 5 ' The
146. I.R.C. § 2(b)(3)(B)(i) (West 1994) (taxpayer shall not qualify if the dependent
would only be a dependent because of § 152(a)(9) (dependent is unrelated person)); SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.05[3][c]; see Whalen v. Commissioner, 35
T.C.M. (CCH) 611 (1976) (Service conceded that taxpayer was entitled to dependency ex-
emption for cohabitant, but denied use of head of household rates because the member of
his household was unrelated to the taxpayer).
147. As the term implies, adult adoption is the adoption of one adult by another, creat-
ing a relationship of parent and child, with the exception that the adopting partner has no
legal duty to support the adopted partner. see Cameli, supra note 2, at 465 (observing that
adult adoption has the effect of severing the legal relationship between the adopted partner
and her or his biological parents); Heeb, supra note 3, at 356; Peter N. Fowler, Comment,
Adult Adoptions: A New Legal Tool for Lesbians and Gay Men, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 667, 677 (1984).
148. See ALL-STATES PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 49, at 4-1 to -378 (providing a com-
pendium of state statutes dealing with intestacy); Cameli, supra note 2, at 465 (beyond nulli-
fying the status of blood relatives of the adopted partner, adult adoption is helpful in situa-
tions in which next-of-kin status is critical, such as medical emergencies, gaining access to
personal and medical files, and making funeral arrangements); Developments in the
Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at 1626 (stating that every state cur-
rently recognizes the inheritance fights of an adopted child of an unmarried intestate decedent
over those of the decedent's nonimmediate blood relatives); see also SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND THE LAW, supra note 75, at §l.05[21[al-[g] (including as advantages of adult adoption
the acquisition of employment, housing, and evidence of a close relationship for purposes of
beneficiary designation on a life insurance policy).
149. Developments in the Law-Sexuality and the Law, supra note 6, at 1626; see
Jefferey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 PITT. L. REV. 225,
253-62 (1981); Heeb, supra note 3, at 356.
150. Sherman, supra note 50, at 253-54. Note, however, that although the blood relatives
of the adopter would not have standing to contest the will, they would have standing to
contest the adoption itself after the adopter's death. Id. at 259. Sherman promotes adult
adoption as advantageous to the homosexual testator who promptly informs prospective heirs
of the adoption so that the statute of limitations on actions to vacate adoption decrees may
run. Id. at 260. Nevertheless, he notes inheritance rights are usually determined by the stat-
utes in force at the time of the decedent's death rather than at the time of adoption such
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statutory treatment of adult adoption varies from state to state, 5' as does its
treatment in the courts.'52 Nevertheless, due to the permanency and possibili-
ty of prosecution for incest, same-sex couples should be cautious about opting
for adult adoption.'53
From a tax standpoint, adult adoption raises estate tax concerns such as
who should adopt whom. Because those who have been adopted lose the right
to inherit from their biological parents, it is probably better to have the partner
with the wealthiest relatives be the adopter.'54 Another consideration is the
that "adoption is necessarily a somewhat speculative estate planning technique, since the
applicable law can be changed after adoption." Id. at 256 n.147; see also Developments in
the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at 1626.
151. See Sherman, supra note 50, at 254-56, 255 nn.141-42 (four states-Hawaii, Idaho,
Ohio, and Virginia-restrict adoption such that same-sex partners would not be allowed to
adopt under their statutes; five others-California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Nevada, and
New Jersey-require that the adoptee be younger than the adopter, while Arizona and Ne-
braska do not allow adult adoption under any circumstances); see also Sol Lovas, When Is a
Family Not a Family? Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheritance Within the Non-Tradition-
al Family, 24 U. IDAHO L. REV. 353, 373 (1988); Heeb, supra note 3. at 356 n.45; Devel-
opments in the Lavv-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at 1626-28.
152. Compare hI re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1984) (denying
petition of 57-year-old man to adopt his lifelong 50-year-old gay partner because the adop-
tion was seen as a quasi-marital vehicle for legitimizing a sexual relationship between unmar-
ried partners) with 333 East 53rd Street Assocs. v. Mann, 503 N.Y.S.2d 752,755 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1986) (permitting adoption involving two adult women for purposes of succeeding in
tenancy following the death of the co-tenant under New York City rent and eviction regula-
tions because economic concerns were the primary motivation of the adoption), aff'd, 512
N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1987) and In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Fam.
Ct. 1981) (holding that public policy did not bar adoption of 26-year-old man by his 22-
year-old gay partner because the two were competent and consenting adults and the adoption
was for legitimate legal and economic reasons). See also Developments in the Law-Sexual
Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at 1626-28.
153. See Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at
1626 n.151. There are several disadvantages to adult adoption. The foremost is that adoption
is final, as are the attendant property assignments. There is no equivalent to divorce available
to adopted partners who may wish to dissolve their relationship. Another disadvantage is that
some state statutes prevent adopted partners from inheriting from their biological parents.
Also, in some states adult adoption may subject the parties to state incest laws. Id.; see also
Heeb, supra note 3, at 357-58 (stating that adult adoption is an inadequate option because
adoption defines the relationship as parent-child, rather than marital, and adoptions are irrevo-
cable). Because of lack of consanguinity, sexual interaction between adopter and adoptee
does not constitute incest without a specific reference to adopted children in an incest stat-
ute. Sherman, supra note 50, at 258.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-302 (1986) provides that sexual penetration or sexual in-
trusion inflicted on an adopted child under twenty-one constitutes aggravated incest. COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-6-301 (1986) provides that sexual penetration or sexual intrusion inflicted
on a descendant (for the purposes of this section, descendant includes a child by adoption
only if the person is not legally married to the child by adoption) constitutes incest, a less
serious felony.
154. Sherman, supra note 50, at 257. Further, a lesbian or gay partner from a wealthy
family should be the one to adopt when there are conditions put upon her or his ability to
pass on the family wealth. For example, if the daughter or son of wealthy parents is only
allowed to pass inheritance to "issue," she or he will be able to pass on the wealth to her
or his same-sex partner by adopting them. The Uniform Probate Code reflects the modem
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relative probabilities of which partner will outlive the other. The partner who
is more likely to die first should be the adopter.'55 In addition, adult adoption
triggers income tax considerations such as dependency exemptions and head of
household status.
7. Life Insurance
Life insurance provides another mechanism by which same-sex couples
can attain some of the benefits bestowed upon married couples. By purchasing
life insurance and naming her or his partner as the beneficiary, a lesbian wom-
an or gay man accomplishes a wealth transfer at death similar to a testamenta-
ry disposition.'56 An advantage of life insurance is that it allows the insured
to retain inter vivos power to cancel the policy or alter the beneficiary desig-
nation.'57
The disadvantages of life insurance, however, are worth considering. First,
there is the limitation that the person who procures and owns the life insurance
must have an "insurable interest" in the life of the insured.' An insurable
interest exists when there is kinship, a reasonable expectation of advantage
from the continuance of the insured's life, common ownership of property, or
a business relationship between the beneficiary and the insured."'9 The ab-
sence of one of these relationships, however, does not bar the use of life insur-
ance if the insured procures her or his own insurance and names her or his
partner as beneficiary."
The increased potential of a will challenge by the original beneficiary on
view that class gift terminology such as "issue," "children," "descendants," and "heirs," in
wills and trusts should be interpreted in accordance with the rules governing intestacy with
regard to the inclusion of adopted children. Unif. Probate Code § 2-611 (1983); see also
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-109 (1987) (defining "child" to include the child of an adopting
parent and the adopted person's natural parent for inheritance purposes, except when the
inheritance rights have been divested).
155. See Sherman, supra note 50, at 256 ("If the adopter is the first to die, the adoptee
will inherit by intestacy to the exclusion of the adopter's blood relatives."). In contrast, if
the adoptee predeceases the adopter in a jurisdiction in which adoption cuts off the right of
the adoptee's natural parents and relatives to inherit from the adopted child in the event of
intestacy, they would be without standing to contest a will executed by the adoptee in which
she or he names the adopter partner as beneficiary. Id.; see also infra notes 215-19 and
accompanying text (regarding planning for the use of the $600,000 unified credit against es-
tate tax under I.R.C. § 2010).
156. See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of
Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1110 (1986) (stating that the beneficiary designation in
a life insurance policy serves the same function as the devisee designation in a will).
157. Sherman, supra note 50, at 262.
158. Id.
159. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.1011]; Sherman, supra
note 50, at 262.
160. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.10[l] (proposing that
the insured purchase the policy, naming a relative as the beneficiary, and subsequently
change the designation as beneficiary to her or his partner); Sherman, supra note 50, at 262
("An insured may procure and own an insurance policy on his own life and designate any-




the grounds of undue influence presents a second disadvantage that arises
when the insured changes the designated beneficiary. 6' Also, there may be a
requirement that applicants submit to an HIV antibody test to comply with life
insurance eligibility requirements. 62
Finally, the life insurance strategy has negative estate and gift tax conse-
quences. Assuming the insured retains control over the identity of the benefi-
ciary until death, the insurance proceeds will be taxed as part of the insured's
estate. 6 ' To avoid inclusion, "the insured could irrevocably assign the life in-
surance policy to the beneficiary."'" If the assigned policy is worth more
than $10,000, the insured will be subject to a gift tax on the excess. 65
B. Dissolution of Relationship
1. Contractual Provisions
Many of the problems addressed above with regard to express pooling
agreements and joint ownership may be avoided by including dissolution
agreements in the contracts."6 Beyond the tax consequences, including divi-
sion of property provisions in addition to cooling off, mediation, or arbitration
clauses in the living-together agreement saves frustration and offers the flexi-
bility that married couples gain through prenuptial agreements.'67 Unfortu-
161. Sherman, supra note 50, at 263; see infra notes 207-12 and accompanying text (dis-
cussion of will challenges).
162. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.10[l].
163. 1.R.C. § 2042 (West 1994) (providing that life insurance proceeds are includable in
the decedent's gross estate if the decedent possessed at death any incidents of ownership,
which include the power to change the beneficiaries, to surrender or cancel the policy, to
assign it, revoke it, or pledge the policy for a loan); see I.R.C. §§ 2037-39 (West 1994);
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, 4.14[4][a].
164. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.11[4].
165. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6(a) (as amended in 1974); see SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.11141 (advising couples who have not yet purchased life insur-
ance to have the beneficiary purchase the insurance on the life of the other, presumably the
wealthier partner, so that the policy would be owned by the beneficiary and it would not be
included in the insured's estate).
166. Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that co-
habitation contracts for both heterosexual and homosexual couples are enforceable); see
Zimmer, supra note 3, at 695-96 (stating that contracts provide the only alternative for sepa-
rating same-sex couples because equitable distribution and community property designations
are only available to legally married couples).
167. CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 11:3 to 11:14; see Kaylah C. Zelig, Com-
ment, Putting Responsibility Back Into Marriage: Making a Case for Mandatory Prenuptials,
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1229 (1993). Zelig observed that antenuptial contracts encourage
couples to discuss openly their expectations prior to their commitment, decreasing the need
for courts to exercise what is often abusive discretionary power in discerning the parties'
actual intentions. Another benefit of a contractual provision for dividing property is that
valuations are better made at inception than upon dissolution. Id.; see also SEXUAL ORIENTA-
TION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.06[8] (stating that it is "of utmost importance to
include provisions for termination of the lesbian or gay relationship in the written agree-
ment"). The authors include a checklist of considerations that should be included in such an
agreement. Those considerations include: division of assets upon termination; whether the
agreement is to be similar to community property laws; support arrangements after termina-
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nately, the comparison between divisions of property by married couples upon
legal separation or divorce and that of same-sex couples upon dissolution is of
little help because transfers between spouses incident to a divorce do not result
in the recognition of gain by either spouse." The manner in which the par-
ties of a same-sex couple hold property and the terms of their agreements
primarily determine the tax consequences of the property division upon termi-
nation of the relationship."6 Accordingly, the tax treatment will differ de-
pending on whether the division is equal. An approximately equal division of
the total value of jointly owned, noncommunity property is a nontaxable divi-
sion in which neither gain nor loss is recognized.7 0 The transfer or partition
of jointly held assets upon termination of the relationship should be a nontax-
able division. 7'
In contrast, an unequal division of property-for example, one based on
fair market value instead of in kind-may result in the recognition of gain or
loss if the Service treats the division as a sale or exchange.' Further, the
unequal division possibly will be subject to gift tax.'
If a same-sex couple has selected to take the partnership approach to their
relationship, it is assumed that they did so because they had a financial rela-
tionship or business venture sufficient to meet the tax definition of a partner-
ship. "'74 The partnership is advantageous because no gain or loss is recog-
nized upon distribution of partnership assets to the partners upon termination
of the partnership, except to the extent money distributed exceeds the partner's
tion; treatment of loans made during the relationship; joint tenancy treatment; and agreements
on the disposition of property upon death. Id.
168. I.R.C. § 1041 (West 1994); see SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note
75, § 3.06111 (offering tax analysis of division of property upon dissolution of marriage in
community property settings).
169. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.06[21; Wolk, supra note
46, at 1252.
170. Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158 (stating that the basis of each individual asset
received upon division is the basis of the property when jointly owned). Although this ruling
addressed the division of property pursuant to a divorce proceeding, it should apply to un-
married cohabitants holding property as joint tenants.
171. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (West 1994); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(5) (as amended in 1986).
But see United States v. United States Nat'l Bank, 239 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1956) (noting that
the exception to the nonrecognition treatment arises when one party contributes capital while
the other contributes personal services to jointly held property, in which case, the division of
the property may be considered compensation and is taxed as ordinary income).
172. I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1011-12 (West 1994); see United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65
(1962); Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975). affd, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.
1977); SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.06131; Wolk, supra note 46,
at 1252-53.
173. This result is less likely, but may arise in situations in which a same-sex couple
agrees generally to share their wealth upon termination, but have made no agreement regard-
ing services. The Service may argue that the division results in taxable compensation, but
the couple will assert gift treatment. See supra notes 77-94 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing express pooling agreements). This also raises the issue of implied agreements and Marvin
v. Marvin quasi-contract and quantum meruit remedies. See supra notes 108-24 and accompa-
nying text.
174. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
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basis in the partnership. 75 The distributee partners take a basis in the proper-
ty equal to their bases in their partnership interests reduced by any money dis-
tributed in the same transaction.
76
2. Support Payments
Lesbian and gay couples do not qualify for the tax treatment applicable to
married couples upon their dissolution.'77 Periodic payments of spousal sup-
port are included as gross income to the recipient spouse, but the payor spouse
is allowed an offsetting deduction."7 Alternatively, child support payments
are neither income to the recipient spouse nor deductible to the payor.79
Support payments between same-sex partners upon dissolution likely would
not be income to the recipient partner or deductible to the payor.'" However,
the tax consequences of support payments between same-sex partners have not
been addressed by the Service or the courts, and are, therefore, unclear.' 8'
3. Termination as a Result of Death
The death of a lesbian or gay partner has several federal estate tax conse-
quences. This section will address those consequences, and the ensuing section
will cover estate planning. There are distinct differences between the estate tax
treatment of married couples and unmarried couples. Special provisions are
available for married couples. For example, only one-half of property held in
joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety is included in the estate of a decedent
spouse, while the amount included for a lesbian or gay decedent is determined
based upon contribution.8 2 Married couples also are given the opportunity to
175. 1.R.C. § 731(a) (West 1994).
176. 1.R.C. § 732(b) (West 1994).
177. The relevant Code sections-§§ 71 and 215-specifically refer to the receipt of
periodic support payments by the "spouse," such that it is unlikely that these provisions
apply to same-sex couples. I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (West 1994); see Cain, supra note 79, at 115-
16, 118-23, 129-31 (proposing tax reform recognizing some form of "tax marriage" that
would give parity between married and same-sex couples). Cain suggests an approach that
would tax support payments between same-sex partners at the marginal bracket of the trans-
feree and to exclude the payments from gift taxation.
178. I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (West 1994).
179. I.R.C. § 71(c) (West 1994). For dissolved lesbian or gay relationships involving
children, same-sex couples are actually in an advantageous position because, unlike divorced
couples, the child support payments will not be subject to scrutiny by the Service as dis-
guised alimony.
180. See Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917) (holding, in a pre-section 71 case,
that alimony was not income to the recipient because it was "not founded on a contract,
express or implied, but on the natural and legal duty of the husband to support the wife").
181. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.06[6]. Citing the lack
of treatment by the courts or the Service, the authors caution that "it is difficult advising
clients with any certainty in these matters." The payments could be treated as gifts if they
are voluntary, or ordinary income if they are made pursuant to an ann's-length bargain based
on a quid pro quo understanding. Id.; see also Reppy, supra note 77, at 1699-1704 (address-
ing the effect bankruptcy has on an obligor's duty to make payments according to a dissolu-
tion agreement). In contrast to payments in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support
(which are not discharged by bankruptcy), periodic payments made pursuant to an express or
implied contract between ex-cohabitants are subject to discharge. I1 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)
(1988).
182. I.R.C. § 2040 (West 1994). Section 2040 provides an exception for married couples,
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capitalize on the unlimited marital deduction for all property passing to a
surviving spouse."8
In ascertaining the federal estate tax consequences that result upon the
death of a lesbian or gay partner, the first consideration is to determine the ex-
tent to which property accumulated during the same-sex couple's relationship
is included in the gross estate of the first to die." The major factors in mak-
ing that determination are the form of property ownership and the adequacy of
consideration furnished by the surviving partner.'85 For example, if a lesbian
or gay couple kept their ownership interests separate, or owned property as
tenants in common, the decedent's separately owned or one-half interest is
included in the decedent's estate.
8 6
Complications arise, however, when property is held in joint tenancy. As
noted above, the full value of the jointly held property is included in the gross
estate of the first joint tenant to die, except to the extent that the surviving
tenant contributed money or property toward the acquisition of the proper-
ty." 7 Surviving joint tenants have argued that the performance of domestic
services should constitute adequate consideration for purposes of section 2040-
(a). '8 Structuring the domestic services as part of a contractual duty, howev-
er, may have more favorable estate tax consequences.'89
The adequate consideration problem of section 2040(a) is not limited to
joint tenancy property. If a same-sex couple agrees to divide equally at death
but otherwise requires that the value of the decedent's gross estate include the full value of
all property held by the decedent and any other person as joint tenants. Unless the surviving
joint tenant contributed to the acquisition, the full value of the jointly held property will be
included in the decedent's gross estate. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(a)(2) (1958). The decedent's
estate has the burden of proving that the contribution originated with the survivor. See, e.g.,
Estate of Heidt v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 969 (1947), aff'd per curiam 170 F.2d 1021 (9th
Cir. 1948).
183. I.R.C. § 2056 (West 1994) (allowing a spouse to pass wealth tax-free to her or his
spouse). Up to $600,000 may be passed tax-free to others persons. See I.R.C. § 2010(a)
(West 1994) (allowing a $192,800 estate tax credit that effectively shields transfers of
$600,000 or less from estate tax liability). Thus, through careful planning, a married couple
is able to shelter as much as $1.2 million of their combined estate from federal estate tax.
In contrast, the estate tax on an unmarried person with an estate of $1.2 million is approxi-
mately $470,000. I.R.C. § 2001 (West 1994).
184. See I.R.C. § 2031 (West 1994) (defining "gross estate").
185. Wolk, supra note 46, at 1290.
186. See I.R.C. § 2033 (West 1994).
187. Wolk, supra note 46, at 1291-92.
188. When a same-sex partner purchases joint tenancy property solely with her or his in-
come, § 2040(a) treats that partner as furnishing the full consideration for the purchase,
unless the creation of the tenancy is supported by consideration in money or money's worth
furnished by the other partner. If the other partner is supplying domestic services instead of
furnishing property or other easily quantifiable contributions, courts have uniformly held that
in the context of marriage such services performed by a spouse do not constitute consider-
ation in money or money's worth for purposes of § 2040(a). See, e.g., Estate of Lyons v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 605, 610 (1976) (quoting Estate of Loveland v. Commis-
sioner, 13 T.C. 5, 7 (1949)); SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.06[7];
Wolk, supra note 46, at 1294-95.
189. As part of a contractual duty, the performance of domestic services may constitute
adequate consideration for purposes of § 2040(a). See I.R.C. § 2040(a) (West 1994).
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all property accumulated during their relationship, the surviving partner may
have an enforceable claim against the decedent's estate."9 A claim against an
estate, founded upon a promise or agreement, is deductible to the extent that it
was "contracted bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth."' 9' Presumably, a good faith agreement to perform do-
mestic services, in return for a transfer of property at death, gives rise to a
deductible claim supported by adequate and full consideration under section
2053. 192
Once the amount of the decedent's taxable estate is determined, all of the
decedent's taxable gifts are added to the sum,' 93 and the tax is calculated on
the total."9 The estate is allowed a unified credit against the tax of
$192,800," g  which effectively shields estates of $600,000 or less from estate
taxes.'" Because the highest estate tax is now fifty-five percent, 97 the de-
nial of the unlimited marital deduction for lesbian and gay couples clearly re-
sults in tremendous inequity.
C. Estate Planning
In general, it is the fact of being neither legally mar-
ried nor biologically related to one's intended beneficiary,
rather than the fact of being lesbian or gay, which presents
special problems. Much folklore and misconception, how-
ever, abound in the lesbian and gay community regarding
estate planning. People often wait too long to seek legal
advice, or never seek it at all. When that happens, the
client is at the mercy of a legal system which was not
designed to recognize, facilitate, or benefit relationships,
no matter how long-term, between two lesbians or two gay
190. Wolk, supra note 46, at 1296 (citing Tyranski v. Piggins, 205 N.W.2d 595 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1973)).
191. I.R.C. § 2053(c)(l)(A) (West 1994).
192. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Amarillo v. United States, 422 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir.
1970). In Amarillo, an individual brought an action against the decedent's estate alleging the
decedent had promised to leave her his property upon his death in return for her promise to
help manage his household, run the ranch, and take care of his personal needs. Id. at 1386.
The court held that the claim was "against the estate," and therefore, the amount paid to
settle the claim was deductible for estate tax purposes. Id. at 1388. However, similar agree-
ments have not fared as well in producing deductible claims for purposes of I.R.C. § 2053.
Such agreements raise the issue of whether the performance of domestic services constitute
adequate consideration for purposes of § 2053. Additionally, any such agreement presumably
will be subject to judicial inquiry as to whether it was made at "arm's length," and for full
and adequate consideration. Wolk, supra note 46, at 1296-97; see also SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.06[7].
193. I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2503 (West 1994).
194. I.R.C. § 2001(b) (West 1994).
195. I.R.C. § 2010 (West 1994).
196. I.R.C. § 2001(c)(1) (West 1994).
197. I.R.C. § 2001(c)(1) (West 1994). The highest estate tax is assessed on estates of $3
million or more. Id.
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males.'98
Estate planning for lesbian women and gay men is a subset of general
estate planning.'" This section addresses some estate planning problems that
are peculiar to same-sex couples. The primary objective in estate planning for
lesbian women and gay men is to secure a method of carrying out their inten-
tions, regarding both the management of assets and personal care, should they
become incapacitated, as well as the disposition of their estates upon death. As
one treatise observes, "if anything sets estate planning for the lesbian or gay
client apart from estate planning for any other unmarried person, it is the need
for a comprehensive written plan in documents which are absolutely clear in
their intent, possibly to the point of being redundant."'
1. Intestacy
As discussed earlier, state intestacy laws discriminate against same-sex
couples in that lesbian and gay relationships are considered invalid for purpos-
es of distributing the estate of a decedent partner who dies without a will. -0'
To prevent leaving a surviving partner out of the distribution of the decedent
partner's estate, lesbian women and gay men may resort to adult adoption, 2
or other more conventional estate planning mechanisms such as wills, trusts,
joint ownership, powers of attorney, conservatorships, insurance, and living
wills. Unfortunately, these planning options are not always utilized, leaving the
surviving partner in the uncomfortable position of trying to maintain posses-
sion of her or his deceased partner's assets despite the intestacy laws. 3
2. Wills
Wills present a problematic area for same-sex couples. Although preparing
a will is usually a better strategy than intestacy, a bequest to a same-sex part-
ner often will be subject to challenge by relatives of the decedent testator. 4
198. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.02.
199. For general estate planning analysis, see 5 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS (1984 & Supp. 1993); CHARLES L. B.
LOWNDES & ROBERT KRAMER FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES (2d ed. 1962); STEPHENS
ET AL., supra note 79; Tax Mgmt. (BNA) I I lth.
200. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.02.
201. See supra note 49 (summarizing the state's role in effectively writing a will for a
decedent without one, but noting that only spouses and relatives receive under intestacy
laws).
202. See supra notes 146-154 and accompanying text.
203. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.12. The surviving
partner can pursue a number of actions to increase the likelihood of succeeding in her or his
attempt to gain some or all of the estate. Among them are: (a) administrating and preserving
the estate; (b) jointly owning personal property; (c) using gift "causa mortis" clauses; (d)
leasing and owning homes together; (e) incorporating claims for services rendered; and (f)
supplying benefits to the survivor through legal representation. Id.
204. See CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 9:6 (cautioning lesbian women and gay
men who have relatives vehemently opposed to their sexual orientation that they stand a
greater risk of having their wills challenged if they leave property to their partner or to a
gay rights organization); SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.04[6]
(noting that a will should be used in addition to non-probate devices, such as joint tenancy
and trusts, as a means of assuring the avoidance of intestate succession). See generally
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If a gay or lesbian person wishes to leave any part of his or her estate to
anyone other than a family member, execution of a will is essential. Although
there are four types of wills-statutory, holographic, nuncupative or oral, and
soldiers' 2"--Iesbian and gay couples should use statutory wills, and should
be careful to observe all technical formalities, such as using proper witnesses,
to increase their chances of withstanding a potential will challenge."
A same-sex couple also should be aware of grounds for contesting a will,
such as improper execution, mental incompetence of the testator, duress, undue
influence, and fraud.2 7 A lesbian woman or gay man can prevent such chal-
lenges to her or his will by drafting new wills periodically without destroying
prior versions. 2 ' This deters potential challengers because the repetition pro-
vides evidence of the testator's seriousness and intent, and because a success-
ful challenge to the last will merely means the previous one is in effect."
A lesbian or gay testator also should revoke any old wills naming ex-
spouses or adult children as legatees or devisees, if it is not her or his inten-
tion that such persons share in the distribution of the estate."' Further, if the
testator desires to exclude his relatives from sharing in the estate, the new will
should name and specifically disinherit those relatives, or leave them a de
minimis amount.2"'
A "no contest" clause is another testamentary mechanism that can be used
to discourage will contests. 1 12 Also known as conditions against contest,
Sherman, supra note 50.
205. See ALL-STATES PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 49, at 1-4 to 1-5. Generally, a statu-
tory will must be written or typed, signed by the testator, and formally subscribed by two or
three witnesses. A holographic will is a handwritten will that evidences a testamentary intent
and is signed by the testator. A nuncupative will is an oral will. Such wills are not recog-
nized in many jurisdictions, except in circumstances where death is imminent at the time of
declaration. A soldiers' will applies to testators who are in actual service. Id.; see also CUR-
RY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 9:9 (discussing the benefits of formal, typed wills over
holographic or nuncupative wills).
206. ALL-STATES PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 49, at I-8 to 1-10; CURRY & CLIFFORD,
supra note 50, at 9:8 to 9:9; SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, §
4.04111; see COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-501 (1987 & Supp. 1994) (requiring the testator be
a minimum of age 18 and of sound mind); COL. REV. STAT. § 15-12-407 (1987) (governing
who has the burden of persuasion as to various issues that arise when a will is contested);
COL. REV. STAT. § 15-11-502 (1987 & Supp. 1994) (stating that a formal statutory will
must be: (1) signed by the testator, or by someone in the testator's presence and under his
direction; and (2) signed by at least two witnesses).
207. THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 90; SEXUAL ORIENTA-
TION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.04[8]; Sherman, supra note 50, at 225; Cameli,
supra note 2, at 464.
208. THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 91. In Colorado, a
will is revoked by subsequent will, in part or in whole, either expressly or by inconsistency.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-507 (1987 & Supp. 1994). Revocation is also effectuated by
physical destruction with intent to revoke. Id.
209. THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 91-92.
210. ALL-STATES PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 49, at 1-6; CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra
note 50, at 9:14; SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.04[2].
211. CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 9:14; SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW,
supra note 75, § 4.04[2].
212. See Sherman, supra note 50, at 248-49 & nn.113-14. Sherman criticizes these testa-
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these devices purport to preclude any legatee or devisee who contests the will
from receiving any legacy or devise thereunder.
From an estate and gift tax perspective, the use of disclaimers adds conve-
nience and flexibility to wills. A "qualified disclaimer" is an irrevocable and
unqualified refusal by a named beneficiary to accept an interest in the devised
property." 3 When a transferor makes a testamentary transfer to another per-
son who makes a qualified disclaimer, federal tax law treats the situation as if
the person making the disclaimer never received the property." 4 According-
ly, federal tax law views the property as passing directly from the testator to a
third party.25 Thus, through the use of disclaimers, a same-sex couple can
name one partner as the primary beneficiary, and designate secondary benefi-
ciaries to whom interests in the estate will pass if the primary beneficiary
disclaims her or his interest.
Since the enactment of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, the
federal government has allowed a "unified credit" against estate taxes.2"6 The
unified credit effectively exempts estates worth $600,000 or less from federal
estate tax.217 The unified credit, especially when used in conjunction with
$10,000 nontaxable gifts"8 and charitable deductions, 29 is an effective tool
in estate planning.22
3. Living Wills, Powers of Attorney, Conservatorships, and
Guardianships
One special concern for H.I.V.-positive testators is the increased likeli-
hood of a will challenge, especially when the testator executes or alters her or
his will while in a weakened mental or physical state induced by the onset of
AIDS dementia.2 ' The specter of AIDS and the case of Sharon
mentary provisions as having limited utility in the case of lesbian and gay testators. The
primary fault of these clauses is that a successful challenge invalidates the condition against
contest. Sherman recommends that conditions against contest be drafted with a provision for
gift over to another legatee in the event a contest is instituted. This protects the no contest
clause in jurisdictions that enforce them only if the will contains a gift over. Id.
213. I.R.C. § 2518(b) (West 1994). The refusal will be deemed a "qualified disclaimer"
only if: (1) the refusal is in writing; (2) the refusal is timely; (3) the refusal is not made
after an acceptance; and (4) as a result of the refusal, the interest passes to the spouse of
the decedent or to a person other than the person making the disclaimer. Id.; see STEPHENS
ET AL., supra note 79, 9 10.07[21[a]-[dl.
214. See I.R.C. § 2518 (West 1994).
215. I.R.C. § 2518(a) (West 1994).
216. I.R.C. § 2010 (West 1994).
217. l.R.C. § 2010(a) (West 1994). Section 2010(a)'s credit of $192,800 serves to offset
the $192,800 tax liability assessed on an estate of $600,000. Id.; see SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.1111]; STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, 1 3.02.
218. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (West 1994).
219. I.R.C. § 2055 (West 1994).
220. ALL-STATES PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 49, at 2-5. Complex estate planning
strategies make use of the unified credit in combination with disclaimers, gifts, trusts, spill-
overs, bypasses, and other creative mechanisms that are beyond the scope of this article.
221. Rubenstein, supra note 41, at 91. Rubenstein asserts:
AIDS has made the lack of a legal relationship crushingly apparent to lesbian
and gay couples: a gay man whose partner is dying of AIDS may have diffi-
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Kowalski222 should motivate same-sex couples to turn to living wills and du-
rable powers of attorney in anticipation of medical emergencies. Living wills,
or directives to physicians, permit individuals to specify in advance the types
of medical treatment they want performed, or do not want performed, in the
event they become incapacitated .1 3 Living will statutes generally allow the
testator to designate someone to whom such decision-making powers are to be
transferred. 224 A power of attorney-either conventional, durable, or spring-
ing-is also an attractive device for anticipating serious illness or a medical
emergency."z
Conservatorships, custodianships, and guardianships are similar to spring-
ing powers of attorney. The former arise after a court makes a determination
culty inquiring about his condition or visiting him in the hospital because the
couple has no legal relationship to one another. Once the lover dies, the surviv-
ing partner will not automatically share in his estate, nor enjoy the tax benefits
of so doing, and may indeed lose control of property the couple purchased to-
gether.
Id.; see CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 9:6 (noting there have been a number of le-
gal challenges to AIDS patients' wills, and encouraging AIDS patients to prepare their wills
promptly); SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.04[31 (highlighting the
need to create documentation and to preserve evidence of capacity); Amy L. Brown, Note,
Broadening Anachronistic Notions of "Family" in Proxy Decisionmaking for Unmarried
Adults, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1066 (1990) (blaming the AIDS epidemic for an increasing
number of cases in which the lover of an incapacitated adult will have to fight the victim's
legal family, the judicial system, and society's views, in order to have a say in her or his
partner's decisions).
222. See supra note 38.
223. See CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 8:21 to 8:24 (exploring the desire for
"self-deliverance" and the right to a natural death, and offering several resources that are
available to terminally ill patients); SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, §
4.08. See generally Gina N. Torielli, Note, Protecting the Nontraditional Couple in Times of
Medical Crisis, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 220 (1989).
224. See Cameli, supra note 2, at 462-63 & n.l10 (maintaining that the use of a living
will-type document in the Kowalski case would have been instrumental, especially if Sharon
Kowalski had manifested her intent to have Karen Thompson act on her behalf). COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (1987) contains the "Colorado Medical Treatment Decision
Act" which generally recognizes the right of a competent adult to accept or reject medical or
surgical treatment affecting his or her person. The Act allows a person to make declarations
as to medical treatment and has been amended to include declarations as to artificial nourish-
ment, life-sustaining procedures, proxies, advance medical directives, durable powers of attor-
ney, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation directives. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18.5-101 to
15-18.6-108 (Supp. 1994).
225. A power of attorney is "a legal document in which one person authorizes another
person to act on the former's behalf." CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 8:2. A con-
ventional power of attorney "is used when a competent person wants someone else to handle
financial matters for her or him." The conventional power automatically terminates when the
creator becomes incapacitated or dies. A durable power of attorney "remains valid even if
the person creating it becomes incapacitated," but terminates upon the death of the creator. A
springing power of attorney is a durable power that does not become effective until the
creator becomes incapacitated. Id.; see id. at 8:3 to 8:20 (discussing generally the importance
of powers of attorney for people with AIDS); SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra
note 75, § 4.07 (exploring the uses of conventional powers of attorney, durable powers, and
"authorization and consent to medical treatment," as a specialized form of power of attorney
in states lacking "durable power of attorney for health care" provisions).
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that an individual is incompetent, while the latter are automatically triggered
by incompetency. 26 Conservatorships, custodianships, and guardianships are
statutory mechanisms that enable a nominated appointee to oversee the estate
of the incapacitated, the person, or both.22 These devices are more formal
than living wills or powers of attorney and require judicial supervision.228
4. Trusts and Nonprobate Transfers
In addition to being subject to challenges, wills are problematic because
they require probate-court proceedings in which the will is filed, assets gath-
ered, debts and taxes paid, and remaining property distributed to beneficia-
ries."' Fortunately, there are several estate planning techniques for avoiding
probate. Inter vivos, or revocable living trusts, are an efficient and effective
wealth-transfer device for same-sex couples .2 1 Irrevocable trusts, when com-
226. CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 8:3; SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW,
supra note 75, § 4.06.
227. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.06[!]-[3] (explicating
the process of nominating a conservator or guardian, supporting the nomination with supple-
mental material, and observing the formalities of execution). The difference between a con-
servatorship and a guardianship, in jurisdictions that provide for both, is that a guardianship
usually requires a finding of legal incompetency, while a conservatorship only requires a
finding of incapacity. Id. § 4.06.
Colorado follows the Uniform Probate Code distinction between guardians and conser-
vators. A testamentary guardian is not a general guardian, so if management of assets is
needed, a separate conservatorship proceeding may be necessary. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-
209 (1987 & Supp. 1994). If permitted by the court, a guardian may receive and expend up
to $5,000 per year for the ward's support, care, and education without conservatorship.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-103 (1987). A testamentary guardian may be appointed by will
or by other writing. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-202 (1987 & Supp. 1994).
228. Because they require judicial supervision, conservatorships, custodianships, and
guardianships are expensive to administer. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra
note 75, § 4.06 (recommending the use of less expensive alternatives, unless there is a need
for close judicial supervision and management of an incapacitated person's personal or finan-
cial affairs).
229. CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 9:24. Because of the substantial effort and
detailed paperwork required in the process, probate is expensive. Furthermore, probate can be
a lengthy process that prevents beneficiaries from receiving their inheritance for years, de-
pending on the details of the estate and the probate court's docket.
230. Unlike testamentary trusts, which are contained in a will, and therefore subject to
probate, inter vivos trusts or living trusts avoid the costs and delays of probate. Inter vivos
trusts usually name the trustor as trustee during her or his lifetime, and provide for a named
successor trustee upon death or incapacity. The substitution of trustee normally occurs with-
out court proceedings so that the details of the trustor's estate remain private. SEXUAL ORI-
ENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.05. See generally CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra
note 50, at 9:25 (stating that revocable living trusts are "usually the best way for a lesbian
or gay person to avoid probate"). But see Sherman, supra note 50, at 262-65, 266 & n.209.
Sherman cautions that an inter vivos trust used by a homosexual may be set aside on the
ground that it was procured by a lover's undue influence. The author sets out the facts of
Knowles v. Binford, 298 A.2d 862 (Md. Ct. App. 1973), and maintains that the applicable
law of undue influence would be the same in the proceeding as in a will contest. A funded
revocable inter vivos trust, however, has a practical advantage over testamentary devises be-
cause it provides for payments to the settlor throughout her or his life, amounting to evi-
dence that the settlor was consistently reminded of the instrument and refrained from revok-
ing it. Sherman, supra note 50, at 262-66.
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bined with "Crummey powers," '23 also can be an effective wealth-transfer
device for lesbian and gay couples. Trusts also are advantageous because they
allow same-sex couples to avoid conservatorship or guardianship of their prop-
erty in the case of incapacity.
232
Revocable living trusts are classified as grantor trusts for tax purposes,
and even if they become irrevocable upon incapacity or death, the trust income
is still taxable to the grantor during her or his lifetime. 33 As discussed above
with regard to the creation of joint bank accounts, the creation of a trust is an
incomplete gift."M Gift tax liability attaches when the grantor dies or be-
comes incapacitated, at which time the trust is considered irrevocable.23 The
primary disadvantage of an inter vivos trust is that the value of the trust prop-
erty is included in the gross estate of the grantor, and is taxable if the grantor
retains a beneficial interest in, or control over, the trust property.2"
Other strategies for avoiding probate are less formal. Totten trusts and
payable-on-death accounts are simple trust-type mechanisms that are essential-
ly normal savings accounts, except that the person owning the account desig-
nates a beneficiary who receives the funds when the depositor dies.237 Life
insurance is another convenient nonprobate alternative for same-sex couples
because one partner can be named as the beneficiary on the policy.23 Final-
ly, joint tenancy ownership also serves as a popular estate planning device for
231. An irrevocable trust may be created to reduce the grantor's estate tax liability by
means of pre-death transfers of assets, protected in part by the $10,000 annual exclusion.
Under an irrevocable transfer, the grantor does not retain a reversionary interest. The purpose
of an irrevocable trust is usually to shift both the property itself and its income from the
grantor's gross estate. Tax Mgmt. (BNA) I1 Ilth, A-17, A-62 to 68.
The transfer of property into an irrevocable trust will result in a transfer for gift tax
purposes. I.R.C. § 2503 (West 1994). However, by making the transfer irrevocable, the
grantor's estate no longer includes the transferred property under I.R.C. §§ 2036. 2037, or
2038. The attractiveness of irrevocable trusts can be enhanced by making them "demand" or
"Crummey" trusts. See Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968). "Crummey"
power trusts give the trust beneficiary an annual availability to withdraw from the trust by
extending a demand right that expires at the end of the year. Under this demand scheme,
the annual gift exclusion is preserved while avoiding the ongoing power to terminate the
entire trust.
232. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.11[5].
233. I.R.C. § 671 (West 1994).
234. The creation of a trust is not subject to gift tax. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-2(b) to (c)
(as amended in 1983).
235. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(f) (as amended in 1983).
236, I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038 (West 1994).
237. CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 9:26; SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW,
supra note 75, §§ 4.05A, 4.10[2]. Totten trusts are available to most depositors of banks and
savings and loan associations. The depositor is allowed to name a beneficiary who receives
ownership of the account balance at the time of the depositor's death. Pay-on-death accounts
only exist in states that have enacted statutes providing therefor. Upon the death of the
owner of the account, the designee can receive the funds upon serving proof of death. Nei-
ther Totten trusts nor payable on death accounts require probate. Note, however, that the
balance in either account will be included in the gross estate of the depositor. I.R.C. §§
2036, 2038 (West 1994).
238. CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 9:27, 9:33; see supra notes 156-165 and ac-
companying text (discussing the tax treatment of life insurance).
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avoiding probate.239
5. State Death Taxes
Almost half the states impose a death tax on the estate, and some of those
death taxes discriminate against property left to anyone other than legal fami-
ly. 2" For estate tax purposes, the applicable state is determined according to
the decedent's domicile state, i.e., her or his principal residence. 24' The estate
receives a limited federal estate tax credit for the amount of state death taxes
actually paid, whether they are in the form of property transmission taxes,
inheritance taxes, or a combination of the two. 2 In addition to state death
taxes, testators should be aware of complications that arise with regard to
choice of law when a will fails to specify which state's law is controlling.243
III. CONCLUSION: A LOOK TO THE FUTURE
Not only does marriage have a future, it has many
futures. There will be, for example, options that permit
different kinds of relationships over time for different
stages in life, and options that permit different life styles
or living arrangements according to the nature of the rela-
tionships .... It is not, however, the specific forms the
options will take that is important but rather the fact that
there will be options, that no one kind of marriage will be
239. See supra notes 125-137 and accompanying text. See generally CURRY & CLIFFORD,
supra note 50, at 9:26 to 9:27; SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, §§
4.09, 4.11131, 4.12121.
240. CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 9:31. Colorado does not have a death tax.
ld; see Lovas, supra note 150, at 382. Lovas notes that there are two basic types of state
death taxes: (1) an estate tax, which is calculated by taxing a certain percentage of the as-
sets owned by the decedent at the time of death; and (2) an inheritance tax, whereby each
heir is taxed a certain percentage on the value of the property that the heir receives. The
author maintains that state death taxes cause "significant problems for the non-traditional
family in four areas: the estate tax marital deduction, the inheritance tax rates, the taxability
of jointly-owned property, and the allocation of the burden of paying the tax due." Id.
241. CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 9:31 to 9:32. A principal residence is usual-
ly the state in which the taxpayer votes and is licensed to drive. Taxpayers who move
around on a frequent basis may be subject to multiple estate taxes and should declare one
state as their legal home. Id.
242. I.R.C. § 2011 (West 1994); cf I.R.C. § 2604 (West 1994) (a credit allowed under
§ 2604 for a state tax imposed on a generation-skipping transfer will not qualify for the §
2011 credit against federal estate taxes); STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, 3.03. If the
estate falls prey to death taxes in two states, both taxes qualify for the credit. Id. (citing
Rev. Rul. 70-272, 1970-1 CB 187). The credit for state death taxes is limited because it
cannot be applied in conjunction with the unified credit of I.R.C. § 2010 to result in a tax
refund. I.R.C. § 2011(f) (West 1994).
243. The meaning and effect of a disposition is determined by the law of the state se-
lected by the testator in her or his will, unless contrary to provisions relating to elective
share, exempt property, and property allowances, or other public policies of Colorado. COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-11-602 (1987). In Colorado, a written will is valid if its execution com-
plies with the law of the state where it was executed at the time of execution, or of the
law of the state where, at the time of execution or death, the testator was domiciled. COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-11-506 (1987 & Supp. 1994).
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required of everyone, that there will be recognition of the
enormous difference among human beings which modem
life demands and produces. It will come to seem incongru-
ous that everyone has to be forced into an identical
mold.2"
As discussed earlier, Hawaii has taken steps towards legalizing same-sex
marriage.245 Additionally, a growing number of municipalities have passed
domestic partnership provisions that expand the availability of certain benefits
that were previously reserved for married couples.2" These victories indicate
a growing momentum. They signal a movement within the political structure
to recognize the validity of same-sex relationships and put an end to patent
discrimination. Whether these acknowledgments are the result of expanded
acceptance of the gay community or merely a recognition of changing times
and the reality of the dramatically altered appearance of the American house-
hold, they are significant.247 It may take several years, but the day will come
when lesbian women and gay men are allowed to enter into legally-recognized
marriages.
Legalizing same-sex marriage would have dramatic tax ramifications.
Same-sex couples could probably take advantage of joint return filing, marital
deductions, interspousal transfer provisions, estate tax benefits for joint inter-
ests in property, and the like. However, many of the federal tax provisions
benefitting heterosexual couples use words such as "husband" and "wife,"2
such that the Code would have to be amended to expand the definition of
spouse. Although legalizing same-sex marriages would effectively remove
many of the discriminatory legal barriers faced by lesbian women and gay
men, it would not remove discrimination altogether. Some members of the gay
community, however, do not support the prospect of legalized same-sex mar-
244. JESSIE BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 270-71 (1982).
245. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text; Richard D. Mohr, The Case For
Gay Marriage, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 215 (1995); Otis R. Damslet,
Note, Same-Sex Marriage, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 555 (1993); William M.
Hohengarten, Note, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy, 103 YALE L.J. 1495
(1994).
246. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
247. See Cox, supra note 22, at 5 (stating that the impetus for the movement to expand
the provision of recognition and benefits from traditional nuclear families to alternative fam-
ilies is the recognition of the decreasing prevalence of the nuclear family in the last few de-
cades); Eblin, supra note 31, at 1086 (commenting that the definition of family has been
evolving away from the traditional norm of a nuclear family); Looking for a Family Resem-
blance, supra note 6, at 1640 n.l (citing 1988 census figures indicating only 27% of Ameri-
can households consist of two parents living with children). For an illustration, see Braschi
v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 51, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that "the term fami-
ly ... should not be rigidly restricted to those people who have formalized their relation-
ship by obtaining ...a marriage certificate," but rather "should find its foundation in the
reality of family life").
248. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2040(b) (West 1994) (concerning estate tax treatment of "joint
interests of husband and wife").
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riage. Opponents 49 of same-sex marriage argue that marriage is a sexist,
patriarchal institution,2" and that by entering into such an institution, lesbian
women and gay men are forced to assimilate into mainstream society and lose
their voice and visibility. 25' Additionally, they argue that same-sex marriage
should be opposed because marriage, by definition, holds certain relationships
more valid than others, s2 and is simply not the best option for a lesbian
woman's or gay man's personal lifestyle. 53
Despite this opposition, the idea of same-sex marriage has garnered sub-
stantial, if not overwhelming, support. One commentator has observed:
Advocates of lesbian and gay marriage as a high priority argue
that as long as lesbian and gay people are denied this privilege, they
are denied full citizenship. While they recognize the possible prob-
lems with embracing marriage, because of its patriarchal history, they
also suggest that allowing lesbian and gay people to enter marriage
would transform the institution. Marriage could become an institution
of intimacy between equals if same-sex couples could marry. Thus,
attaining marriage for lesbian and gay people should be a priority,
because that step would make marriage-dependent benefits available
to lesbian and gay people while radicalizing the institution of mar-
riage."
Clearly, the priority of endowing same-sex couples with the range of tax
benefits otherwise reserved for heterosexual married couples is an important
argument for legalizing same-sex marriage.
249. For the purposes of this article, the arguments against legalizing same-sex marriage
are restricted to those in the gay community. For alternative arguments against legalizing
same-sex marriage, see G. Sidney Buchanan, Same-Sex Marriage: The Linchpin Issue, 10 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 541 (1985). For a discussion of the gay and lesbian intra-community
debate, see Harlon L. Dalton, Reflections on the Lesbian and Gay Marriage Debate, I LAW
& SEXUALITY 1 (1991); Nitya Duclos, Some Complicating Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage,
I LAW & SEXUALITY 31 (1991); Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage
Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men, and the Intracommunity Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE (forthcoming May 1995); Claudia A. Lewis, Note, From This Day Forward: A
Feminine Moral Discourse on Homosexual Marriage, 97 YALE L.J. 1783 (1988).
250. Ruth Colker, Marriage, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 321 (1991); Cox, supra note 22,
at 66; Ettelbrick, supra note 73, at 20.
251. Ettelbrick, supra note 73, at 21, 22 ("The moment we argue, as some among us in-
sist on doing, that we should be treated as equals because we are really just like married
couples and hold the same values to be true, we undermine the very purpose of our move-
ment and begin the dangerous process of silencing our different voices."). But see Colker.
supra note 250, at 321-22 (stating that some members in the lesbian and gay community be-
lieve there is no reason to assume marriage will help lesbians and gays achieve social legiti-
macy, and that same-sex marriages will result in lesbians and gays having to "sacrifice some
of their anonymity, making them even easier targets for discrimination").
252. Ettelbrick, supra note 73, at 20.
253. Cox, supra note 22, at 66; Steven K. Homer, Note, Against Marriage, 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505 (1994).
254. Colker, supra note 250, at 322.
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